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Summary 
A considerable amount of research effort has, and continues to be invested into 
technologies and algorithms for capabilities which are forecast to be needed in future 
uninhabited vehicles.  Much of this research is conducted with the aim of increasing 
the level of autonomy of these vehicles.  However these technologies and 
capabilities provide only a part of the total system solution and must be integrated 
into an architecture that covers the entire vehicle system.  This total system approach 
is particularly relevant since this is how airworthiness regulators consider Uninhabited 
Aircraft Systems. 
Airworthiness of uninhabited aircraft has been addressed by Australian aviation 
regulators.  While the regulations may be in place, technical challenges still remain 
for the suppliers of these systems.  For example, one of these unresolved technical 
challenges is the capability of uninhabited aircraft to “see and avoid” other aircraft.  
The operation of manned and uninhabited aircraft in the same airspace remains an 
issue and certification of uninhabited aircraft for unrestricted operations remains a 
challenge. 
The work described here has used the systems engineering approach to develop a 
high level architecture for a generic Uninhabited Aircraft System.  The architecture 
was derived from airworthiness regulations.  Since the primary difference between 
piloted and uninhabited aircraft is the presence of an on-board human pilot, this is the 
main area which this architecture describes. 
Australian airworthiness regulations were taken as the starting point to provide 
requirements.  This ensured that the statutory requirements were considered in the 
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development of the architecture.  The requirements and functional analysis 
techniques from systems engineering were applied to the airworthiness regulations.  
This produced a set of derived requirements and a functional description of the UAS.  
The requirements analysis results in a “black box” or external description of the 
necessary properties and qualities of the system.  Functional analysis produces a 
“white box” or internal description of the workings of the system which allows 
decomposition into smaller elements. 
The requirements and functional description which have been developed are generic 
and are applicable to many Uninhabited Aircraft Systems.  The resultant architecture 
may be used in conjunction with operational requirements to develop a specific 
Uninhabited Aircraft System.  Since the architecture is generic, it may also be used to 
provide the structure of a simulation model of an Uninhabited Aircraft System. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAV) have been around since at least World War I 
(Siuru 1991) and have been employed by the armed forces of various nations in 
many major conflicts in the intervening period.  However, it is only relatively recently 
that they have begun to receive wide-spread acceptance and increased use. 
Many research papers and programs involve investigations into technologies and 
algorithms for capabilities that are forecast to be needed in future uninhabited 
vehicles.  Much of this research is conducted with the aim of increasing the level of 
autonomy of these vehicles.  However all of these technologies and capabilities 
provide only a part of the total system solution and must be integrated into an 
architecture that covers the entire vehicle system. 
1.2 Overview 
This thesis provides one such architecture.  The systems engineering process was 
used to develop a functional description of a generic Uninhabited Aircraft System 
(UAS).  A UAS contains both a UAV and a ground segment, which provides the 
interface to the human operator, allowing command and control (C2) of the system. 
Airworthiness regulations were taken as the starting point to provide requirements.  
This ensures that the resulting functional description accommodates the 
requirements of the mandatory airworthiness regulations.  Requirements analysis 
was conducted to identify the functions which must be performed to satisfy 
compliance. 
Functional analysis was then conducted to identify the implicit functions and develop 
a functional hierarchy. 
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Since the functional description is generic, it may provide a framework for the 
integration of many specialised technologies.  One such technology is integrated 
flight and payload control.  This provides the capability to integrate air vehicle flight 
and payload control, providing a system that can maintain payload pointing through a 
combination of payload steering demands and aircraft flight control surface demands.   
The requirements and functional description are generic and may be applied to 
specific UAS in conjunction with detailed operational requirements and the payloads 
needed to accomplish a particular mission. 
1.3 Aim of the Research 
The aim of this research is to develop a high-level functional description for a generic 
UAS. 
The functional description will be derived from Australian civil airworthiness 
regulations.  This will ensure that the mandatory requirements are considered during 
the system development. 
The functional description should be generic so that it is widely applicable and able to 
form the basis of future developments. 
The architecture should allow the integration of specialised aviation and UAS specific 
technologies. 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
This chapter has provided an introduction to the subject of the research reported in 
this thesis.  The remaining chapters expand on this introduction and provide more 
detail and the results of the research which has been undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 2 contains the literature review.  The published engineering literature was 
searched for similar work.  The results of this search are presented. 
CHAPTER 3 provides an overview of the systems engineering process as applicable 
to the work described in this thesis.  The relevant aspects of systems engineering are 
the analysis of requirements and functionality.  There are many other aspects of 
systems engineering which are not discussed since they are not necessary for the 
development of a generic functional description. 
CHAPTER 4 describes the analysis of the system level requirements.  Australian 
airworthiness regulations were used as the system level requirements. 
CHAPTER 5 describes the analysis of the system level functionality.  This analysis 
identified the implicit functionality in the system. 
CHAPTER 6 describes the analysis at the subsystem level which followed the system 
level analysis. 
CHAPTER 7 contains a discussion of problems and observations noted during the 
research. 
CHAPTER 8 is the summary and concluding remarks. 
CHAPTER 9 contains the list of references. 
Appendix One (CHAPTER 10) contains the results of the system level requirements 
analysis process. 
Appendix Two (CHAPTER 11) contains the data dictionary tables. 
Appendix Three (CHAPTER 12) contains the results of the functional analysis at the 
system level. 
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Appendix Four (CHAPTER 13) contains the function hierarchy diagrams. 
Appendix Five (CHAPTER 14) contains the functional flow diagrams. 
Appendix Six (CHAPTER 15) contains the functional requirements and functional 
allocation at the subsystem level. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 A Brief History of UAV Use 
UAVs have been used for military purposes since at least World War I (Siuru 1991).  
Munson (1988) described over 320 different UAVs, many of which have numerous 
variants and derivatives, developed by companies and organisations from all around 
the world.  For much of their history, the use of UAVs has been dominated by military 
applications.  Current UAS, and forecasts of the systems, employment and 
technology expected to be used by the US armed forces are described in US 
Department of Defense documents (OSD 2002; OSD 2005; Office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 2004).  Although 
military forces are still the main operators of UAS, in recent decades there has been 
a growing recognition of the potential for civilian and research applications all around 
the world. 
2.2 UAV Activity and Applications 
Wilson (2003) presented a perspective on world wide UAV activity.  At the time of his 
article, at least 36 countries were actively involved in either development or 
acquisition programs for UAVs.  The most active countries included the UK (18 
programs), France (over 24 programs), Russia (18 programs), Israel (20 programs), 
Turkey (at least six programs) and the USA with at least 60 military programs.  
Defence spending in the US on UAV programs during the 2002 fiscal year was 
$US716 million.  The approved budget for UAV programs in the 2003 fiscal year was 
$US1.2 billion with forecast budget requests of $US1.4 billion and almost $US2 
billion in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 respectively. 
In Australia during 2002, there were at least seven UAV development programs with 
civilian, military and research applications (staff writers & Blackman 2002).  La 
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Franchi (2005) described the range of activity and the level of interest in UAVs in the 
Australian defence community.  The need for an integrated and coordinated 
approach to the development of a UAV capability and acquisition of systems was 
emphasised. 
Wegener et al. (2004) described the use of autonomous heterogenous multiple UAV 
systems for Earth science and monitoring applications.  An architecture for autonomy 
was presented.  Various civilian mission concepts for UAVs were discussed along 
with the benefits to be gained from levels of autonomy above that currently available.  
Krabill (2005) describes the potential use of UAVs for science applications over ice 
sheets and glaciers in the Arctic and Antarctic.  These applications included 
measurement of glaciological parameters (surface elevation, ice velocity, ice 
thickness and surface melt detection), mapping bedrock topography, investigation of 
melt ponds on sea ice and measurement of the depth of snow cover on sea ice.  
Horcher and Visser (2004) present the results of a trial application of UAV technology 
to forestry management.  A small UAV was used to provide both still and video 
imagery of research sites in a national park for mapping and monitoring purposes.  
The potential applications included monitoring for water quality violations, detection 
of timber theft, detection of erosion in road and drainage networks, and the detection 
of trespass and other illegal activities.  Srinivasan et al. (2004) describe the use of an 
Airborne Traffic Surveillance System which includes UAVs for the monitoring of 
highways and traffic conditions.  This work was conducted by the University of Florida 
in conjunction with the Florida Department of Transportaation.  Work is also 
progressing on the consideration of business models for the delivery of UAV services 
to support science applications (NASA Suborbital Science Office 2004). 
The preceding summary provides a very high level introduction to the level of UAV 
and UAS activity and the range of potential applications for these systems.  If UAVs 
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are employed for even a number of these applications then the level of unmanned 
systems activity will increase considerably.  The technical challenges involved in 
developing UAS for these applications are generally manageable.  The main 
challenge lies in the airworthiness of UAS and their operation in civil airspace. 
2.3 Airworthiness Certification of UAS 
Widespread use of UAS, outside restricted airspace, including possibly over 
populated areas, will require civil airworthiness certification.  The Australian Civil 
Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) has published airworthiness regulations specifically 
for UAS (CASA 2002).  These regulations cover the design, maintenance and 
operation of UAS and the training of operators.  Papachristofilou, Kaempf and 
Wagner (1997) discuss the requirements and design of a UAV system for certification 
and flight in civil airspace.  Given that at the time of writing, no specific regulations 
existed, the authors adopted civil airworthiness principles.  These included the 
probability of a third-party fatality (less than 10-9 per flight hour as a result of any 
failure) and that there should be no discernible difference between manned and 
unmanned aircraft from the perspective of Air Traffic Control authorities.  Rogers 
(2000) considers the safety and airworthiness of a UAV system, from the UK 
perspective, and the general requirements which flow into the system specifications.  
The military perspective of safety and airworthiness is discussed in detail.  The 
development of Part 9 of DEF STAN 00-970 (MoD 2003) which is the UK military 
standard for airworthiness of UAS is discussed.  Haddon and Whittaker (2003) 
describe the considerations and method of developing civil airworthiness 
requirements for UAS in the UK.  These authors work in the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority.  Their paper presents the CAA position regarding the design standards to 
be applied for civil certification of UAS.  From the US, the HALE UAV Certification & 
Regulatory Roadmap (NASA ERAST Alliance n.d.) describes proposed airworthiness 
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requirements for a High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) UAV.  These US 
requirements appear similar to the Australian CASA requirements.  Papers by Weibel 
and Hansman (2005) and DeGarmo and Nelson (2004) both discuss considerations, 
including safety, for the operation of UAS in the US National Airspace System. 
Airworthiness authorities consider each UAS in its entirety.  The ground-based 
elements are a part of the system and have an effect on airworthiness.  An 
organisation seeking to obtain certification for an uninhabited air vehicle must 
therefore consider the whole system; the UAS rather than only the UAV.  Cameron 
(1995) and Fahlstrom and Gleason (1992) are two sources which provide an 
overview of the elements of a UAS.  Scheithauer and Wunderlich (1997) consider the 
architecture of a UAS from a system integrity perspective.  This paper considers 
military systems and includes aspects not relevant to civil systems such as hostile 
threats.  The authors conclude that system architectures, design methods and 
verification methods must be developed to provide cost-effective high integrity 
systems.  White (2003) treats an Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) as a 
system and considers the integration of the human element.  This paper presents a 
variable autonomy system which provides varying levels of support to the human 
operator depending upon task and workload.  An allocation of functionality between 
the operator and the computer system is proposed.  The author concludes by 
presenting a staged introduction of autonomy into unmanned systems. 
The airworthiness certification of UAS and their operation in civil airspace pose 
challenges.  The above references provide an overview of these challenges and 
some proposed responses.  A rigorous systems engineering process will assist in 
meeting these challenges and must be part of the response. 
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2.4 Systems Engineering 
Engineering Management (1974) defines systems engineering as “A logical 
sequence of activities and decisions transforming an operational need into a 
description of system performance parameters and a preferred system configuration”.  
This reference is a military standard describing the process of systems engineering.  
An equivalent and more recent civilian standard is Processes for Engineering a 
System (1999). 
There are a number of handbooks describing in more detail how to apply the 
process.  Many large organisations produce their own handbooks describing how the 
process is to be applied in that organisation.  An example from the US Department of 
Defense is Systems Engineering Fundamentals (1999).  Examples produced by 
civilian agencies include those by the European Space Agency (Space Engineering: 
System Engineering 1996) and NASA (1995).  Text books on the subject of systems 
engineering are also available; one example of which is by Blanchard and Fabrycky 
(1998). 
The application of systems engineering methods ensures that the entire system is 
considered.  Published examples of the application of the systems engineering 
process seem to be uncommon in the refereed technical literature.  One example is 
Adams (1995), who presents an example of the functional decomposition process 
applied to a real-time planning and decision making system. 
2.5 UAS Technology Trends 
This section provides examples of technology developments which are applicable to 
UAS.  None of these technologies will be discussed in detail.  They are presented to 
provide an overview of the types of technologies which will need to be integrated into 
a complete UAS architecture. 
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The trend in military systems is towards increasing levels of autonomy, as discussed 
in OSD (2002) and OSD (2005).  Robinson (2004) quotes that (in the context of the 
US Army’s Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft (UCAR) programme) the goal is to 
eliminate the ‘vigilant monitoring’ needed for current UAVs. 
There are a number of aspects to the problem of autonomy.  Some of these aspects 
include decision making, path planning and re-planning, cooperation with other 
autonomous vehicles and collision avoidance.  Gancet et al. (2005) present an 
architecture for decision making in a heterogenous multiple UAV system.  Both the 
ground and air elements of the system are considered and decision making may 
occur at different places in the system.  Schiller and Draper (1991) developed a 
simulation using a neural network for UAV navigation in uncertain environments.  The 
robustness of the neural network re-planner improved the probability of mission 
success.  Other path planning research is presented by Schouwenaars et al. (2004), 
Jenkins (1987) and Zheng, Ding and Zhou (2003).  Two approaches to path planning 
for multiple vehicles are presented by McInnes (2003) and Pongpunwattana and 
Rysdyk (2004).  Rathinam et al. (2004) presents an architecture for controlling a 
team of UAVs to search for targets in a given region.  Penney (2005) presents a 
method for performing collision avoidance on autonomous UAVs. 
One approach which has benefits both in increasing autonomy and in reducing 
operator workload is to integrate the control of the vehicle with the payload.  Williams 
and Davidson (1991) developed an airborne re-planner which directs the aircraft to 
investigate targets found by the sensor.  A real-time rule-based artificial intelligence 
(AI) component written in Forth was used to determine and execute actions based 
upon a database of rules.  The re-planner was linked to the autopilot to command the 
aircraft.  Johnson et al. (2004) describe the development and testing of a UAV with 
integrated flight and payload control.  However in their case, the UAV was to be 
 11 
autonomous and so the ground element was not part of the integration.  Kaminer et 
al. (1998) present a method for the design of integrated guidance and control 
systems for autonomous vehicles.  Thomasson (1998) describes the integrated 
control of a roll-only camera in the nose of an aircraft when used for ground 
observation.  Audenino, Gaglio and Faggion (1992) describe the procedures and 
techniques for automated target tracking and locating using a video payload on a 
tactical UAV. 
These technologies must be implemented in the aircraft avionics and the ground 
segment electronics.  Boskovic, Prasnath and Mehra (2004) present an avionics 
architecture which provides the capability for the UAV to detect and identify faults 
and failures and reconfigure control laws, react to new information such as pop-up 
targets, and autonomously re-plan the mission.  However this work only considers 
the airborne element of the UAV system.  Hitt (2004) discusses some considerations 
for the implementation of future avionics systems.  This reference also considers the 
airborne element although many of the considerations apply to the ground element of 
a UAS.  Rushby (1999) presents a study into partitioning in avionics architectures.  
Kirschbaum (2005) discusses STANAG 4586 which provides a standardised data link 
interface between ground and air segments.  This is particularly important for 
interoperability between different systems. 
None of the technologies mentioned above are covered here any further.  The survey 
above serves to illustrate the breadth and variety of research into UAS technologies 
which is on-going.  Very few of the papers reviewed above consider the technology in 
the context of a system.  However, for use in an actual system, as opposed to a 
simulation, the technology must be integrated into the airborne segment, the ground 
segment or both. 
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The literature survey described above failed to find a significant number of references 
regarding the architecture of UAS.  This is considered to be a problem given that the 
demand for these systems will continue to increase as further applications are found.  
It is, of course, possible that many UAS architectures have been developed but that 
these are proprietary and have not been released for public consideration. 
The work presented in the following sections provides a high-level generic 
architecture for selected elements of a UAS into which different technologies, such 
as those described above, may be integrated. 
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CHAPTER 3 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
3.1 Introduction to Systems Engineering 
Much work has been done and much has been written on the subject of systems 
engineering.  A small selection of works includes references by military agencies 
(Engineering Management 1974; Systems Engineering Fundamentals 1999), civilian 
agencies (ESA 1996; NASA 1995), industry standards bodies (Processes for 
Engineering a System 1999) and academic authors (Blanchard and Fabrycky 1998).  
Possibly as a result of the volume of material available, there is no universally 
accepted definition of systems engineering.  Often, each reference will provide a 
different definition.  However most definitions of systems engineering include the 
following key points: 
• Delivers a solution to satisfy a customer’s needs; 
• Considers the entire lifecycle of the product or system; 
• Is an interdisciplinary effort; and 
• Involves an iterative process of refinement and definition starting from the top 
level requirements. 
These points are explained in more detail below. 
The primary purpose of systems engineering is to ensure that the system or product 
which is developed satisfies the needs of the customer.  This is achieved through the 
activities in the systems engineering processes.  The first activity occurs at the start 
of the development process, with the aim of identifying exactly what the customer 
needs the system to do and any constraints on the system.  The result of this activity 
is expressed as a set of requirements for the system.  Consequently, this activity is 
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often called requirements development or analysis.  Identifying what the customer 
needs may be a significant task in itself.  For novel systems or when untried 
technology is involved, it may be necessary to include concept exploration and 
prototype development phases to identify requirements for the system. 
Functional analysis is the activity which involves the decomposition of functionality.  
Implicit functionality is identified.  Functions are grouped and allocated to subsystems 
or components. 
The output of the requirements analysis and development activity provides the input 
to the design activity.  Design produces a solution to the customer’s need expressed 
as a set of requirements.  Some iteration between the requirements analysis and 
design activities normally occurs.  This takes account of the influence of the available 
technology and its cost on the requirements. 
The final activity occurs at the end of the development process.  This activity is called 
qualification and acceptance.  This involves verifying that the system or product 
which has been developed meets the customer’s needs as expressed in the 
requirements.  This may be achieved through a variety of methods but testing is often 
involved. 
Systems engineering considers the entire life cycle of the system or product under 
development.  A typical product lifecycle is shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1.  A Typical Product Lifecycle 
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Systems engineering facilitates the consideration of support, maintenance and 
disposal during the development phase.  Early consideration of these additional 
aspects enables the developer to arrive at a solution with the lowest whole-of-life 
cost. 
A thorough systems engineering process will ensure that all relevant disciplines have 
input during the development phase.  These disciplines cover both the traditional and 
many specialist areas, including: 
• Engineering (aeronautical, mechanical, electrical, electronic, software, 
chemical, civil, environmental, naval, biomedical, etc); 
• Human factors and Usability; 
• Availability and Reliability; 
• Maintainability and Serviceability; 
• Support (including Supply and Training) and Supportability; 
• Vulnerability and Survivability; 
• Affordability and Life-cycle costing; 
• Interoperability; 
• Produceability and Manufacturability; and 
• other specialities as required. 
Finally, systems engineering employs a process of decomposition and integration.  A 
common view is the V diagram, shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  V Diagram Representation of System Engineering 
The left arm of the V is the decomposition arm.  Here the system design is broken 
down into increasingly smaller elements which can be individually managed and 
developed.  Decomposition begins at the system level with the identification of 
subsystems and continues at the subsystem level with the identification of 
components.  The subsystems and components which were identified are 
subsequently designed.  The structure of the system after decomposition may look 
similar to Figure 3. 
The right arm of the V is the integration arm.  Integration is the activity which forms 
subsystems out of components and a system out of the subsystems.  Integration 
begins at the component level by verifying that the components satisfy their 
requirements.  The components are then integrated into subsystems which are 
verified against the subsystem requirements.  Finally the subsystems are integrated 
into a system which is verified against the system level requirements.  This ensures 
that the system satisfies the customer’s needs.  Complex systems may have 
properties which are not inherent in any of the subsystems or components but rather 
arise from the particular arrangement of those subsystems and components.  These 
 17 
are called emergent properties.  They may be either desirable or undesirable 
properties of a particular system.  Integration should confirm the existence of 
desirable emergent properties and seek to identify any unexpected emergent 
properties. 
 System 
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1 
 Subsystem  
2 
 Subsystem  
3 
 Component  
1 
 Component  
2 
 Component  
3 
 Component  
7 
 Component  
8 
 Component  
9 
 Component  
5 
 Component  
6 
 Component  
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Figure 3.  System Decomposition 
The same system engineering process and activities occur at each of the system, 
subsystem and component levels. 
Systems engineering is a multi-disciplinary process, which uses decomposition and 
integration, and which ensures that the product satisfies the needs of the customer 
throughout the entire lifecycle. 
3.2 The Systems Engineering Process 
The objectives and aspects of systems engineering described in Section 3.1 are 
implemented and achieved through the systems engineering process.  This consists 
of a set of activities which result in the objectives discussed above being satisfied. 
The systems engineering process mostly occurs within the development phase of the 
product lifecycle.  A simplified view of the systems engineering process is shown in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  The Systems Engineering Process 
Figure 4 shows a view of the process applied to a single element of a product with a 
simple “waterfall” lifecycle model.  The waterfall model is a simple linear development 
path.  Real systems are generally too complex for the waterfall model to be effective.  
Other lifecycle models are possible, such as rapid prototyping or the incremental 
development of the spiral model.  A certain amount of iteration will be required to 
converge upon a solution.  For complex systems, the systems engineering process is 
applied concurrently at all levels; system, subsystem and component; with 
information and feedback flowing between levels.  Iteration is required not only in the 
systems engineering process at each level (requirements analysis, functional 
anaylsis, design, integration, test and verification) but also between the system, 
subsystem and component levels. 
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Following delivery of the system, the main activity is often maintenance, support and 
upgrades until the end of the lifecycle when disposal occurs. 
Requirements analysis and functional analysis are the two stages in the process 
which are relevant to this work.  An overview of these activities will be provided in the 
remainder of this chapter, with more details in the following chapters. 
3.3 Systems Engineering Applicable to This Work 
The aim of this work was to develop a generic high-level functional architecture for 
selected elements of a UAS.  The term architecture is used to mean a representation 
of the structure of the system at a high level. 
This research involves the application of systems engineering at both the system and 
subsystem levels.  The research involves the first two steps of the systems 
engineering process in Figure 4; requirements analysis and functional analysis.  The 
result of these two steps will be a set of requirements and a functional model of the 
generic UAS.  The design step is not needed since the architecture is intended to be 
generic and abstract.  The last two steps, integration and test, and qualification and 
acceptance, are also not required. 
The methods of requirements analysis and functional analysis used the following 
steps: 
(a) Analyse the requirements: 
(i) Generate a set of requirements from CASA airworthiness regulations; 
(ii) Maintain traceability back to CASA regulations; 
(iii) Identify requirements (as opposed to headings and explanatory notes); 
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(iv) Identify the type of each requirement; 
(v) Draw the context diagram for the system; 
(b) Perform functional analysis: 
(i) Create a function for each functional requirement allocated to the Mission 
subsystem; 
(ii) Construct a hierarchy of functions derived from the functional requirements; 
(iii) Construct functional flow diagrams; 
(iv) Logically group the functions in the hierarchy; 
(v) Decompose the functional flows; 
(vi) Create additional functions to produce a logical hierarchy and functional flows; 
(vii) Iterate around these steps until the set of functions is complete and 
consistent; 
(viii) Create data flow diagrams with the functions; 
(ix) Create a data dictionary to document the functions and data flows; 
(x) Iterate the functional hierarchy, functional flows and data flows until a 
complete and consistent set of functions and data flows is achieved; 
(xi) Define a generic Product Breakdown Structure (PBS); 
(c) Apply checks to requirements and functional analysis to ensure correctness, 
consistency and completeness. 
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These steps will be described in more detail in the following chapters.  At the 
conclusion of these steps, a set of requirements and a generic functional architecture 
will have been produced. 
3.4 Additional Functional Analysis for Specific System Designs 
While the systems engineering steps described in section 3.3 are sufficient for the 
development of a generic functional architecture, additional steps are required for the 
development of the design of a specific physical system.  These additional steps are: 
(a) Logically group the functions which are similar and have similar interfaces; 
(b) Add lower levels of detail to the PBS by creating new subsystems and 
components; 
(c) Allocate functions to PBS subsystems and components; and 
(d) Identify the major subsystem interfaces. 
These steps are not required for the development of a generic functional architecture 
and will not be considered further. 
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CHAPTER 4 SYSTEM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
This chapter describes the analysis of the system level requirements.  The purpose 
of this analysis was to identify the explicit functional requirements of the system.   
4.1 The Requirements Analysis Process 
The process of analysing the system level requirements consisted of the following 
steps: 
(a) Format the airworthiness regulations (CASA 2002) for analysis; 
(b) Maintain traceability back to the CASA regulations; 
(c) Identify requirements (as opposed to non-requirements which include headings 
and explanatory notes); and 
(d) Identify the type of each requirement. 
These steps will be explained in more detail in the following sections. 
4.2 Input Requirements 
The top level system requirements were taken to be provided by the Australian UAS 
airworthiness regulations (CASA 2002).  An extract of these regulations are provided 
at Table 1 in APPENDIX 1: REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS OF AC101-1(0) 
(CHAPTER 10).  The extract presented in Table 1 contains the requirements 
applicable to the operational elements of a UAS.  The sections not included in the 
extract cover the requirements of the certification process and non-operational 
supporting functions such as training and maintenance.  The sections of AC101-1(0) 
which are not included in Table 1 are: 
• Section 9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Certification; 
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• Section 10 UAV System Maintenance; 
• Section 11 Training Requirements for Pilots and Controllers of UAVs; 
• Section 12 Getting Approval; 
• Section 13 Operator Certification; 
• Section 14 Insurance; and 
• Appendices 1, 2 and 3. 
Table 1 contains the text from the relevant sections of AC101-1(0) in column (c).  The 
text was divided so that each heading, sentence and list element was in a separate 
table row. 
Columns (b) and (a) of Table 1 contain the paragraph reference in AC101-1(0) and a 
unique requirement identifier respectively.  The requirement identifier is prefixed with 
“C” (for CASA).  Column (b) provides traceability from the system requirements back 
to the airworthiness regulations which state the statutory requirements.  Maintaining 
traceability is important for a number of reasons.  Firstly, it provides a means of 
ensuring that all system level requirements have been addressed.  This directly 
supports the purpose of systems engineering.  Secondly, any requirement which 
cannot be traced to a system level requirement or a design decision (for derived 
requirements) is unnecessary.  This may indicate an error in the requirements 
derivation, or that the solution has ‘gold-plating’ (unnecessary additional functionality 
or features) or that there are unnecessary constraints on the design solution. 
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4.3 Requirements Analysis 
An initial analysis of the contents of AC101-1(0) (as extracted in Table 1) was 
performed.  This involved firstly, identifying which table rows contained requirements, 
and secondly, classifying the requirements for further analysis. 
The text of each row in Table 1 was assessed as to whether it contained a 
requirement or not.  Column (d) contains the results of this assessment.  “TRUE” 
indicates that the text in column (c) is a requirement which must be complied with.  
“FALSE” indicates that the text is not a requirement.  This is usually the case for 
headings and comments. 
Each table row containing a requirement (i.e. where column (d) = TRUE) was then 
classified according to the type or types of requirements it contained.  The possible 
types and their meanings are: 
• Certification: a requirement which pertains to the CASA certification process or 
the products necessary to satisfy that process. 
• Design Constraint: a requirement which constrains the design solution.  For 
example a requirement which specifies the use of a particular item of 
equipment. 
• Functional: a requirement which specifies some function (or action) which the 
system must perform. 
• N/A: a requirement type is not applicable because the text is not a 
requirement. 
• Operational: a requirement which specifies how the system should be 
operated or used. 
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• Performance: a requirement which specifies quantitatively how well a function 
must be performed. 
• Safety: a requirement which specifies a safety related objective or constraint.  
These requirements are explicit inputs into a safety analysis process.  The 
analysis of system safety will not be performed or discussed further in this 
thesis.  The safety analysis would be expected to produce additional 
requirements derived from the safety requirements. 
These requirement types are recorded in column (e) of Table 1. 
Requirements propagate to the lower stages of system development.  Functional 
requirement propagate through functional decomposition performed during functional 
analysis.  Performance requirements propagate to subsystems through a budgeting 
and allocation process.  Design constraints propagate either by direct assignment or 
by budgeting and allocation. 
Requirements analysis is an iterative process.  A requirement of one type may result 
in derived requirements of other types in later iterations of the analysis process.  For 
example, design constraints, operational and safety requirements may result in 
derived functional requirements in later iterations.  This may be especially true of 
safety requirements where the subsequent system safety analysis is likely to result in 
additional functional requirements necessary to provide a required level of safety. 
The initial requirements analysis identified the rows in Table 1 containing 
requirements and classified those requirements according to type.  The explicit 
functional requirements were identified. 
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4.4 System Context Diagram 
The system requirements identify the external entities which have interfaces to the 
system.  These entities interact with the system, usually by providing sources of data 
into the system or by acting as sinks for data output by the system.  (A context 
diagram may also show the flow of energy and materials).  A complete context 
diagram allows all of the external interfaces to the system to be identified.  The 
context diagram for the UAS is shown in Figure 5. 
The “Air Traffic Control”, “Other Aircraft” and “Operator” entities in the context 
diagram were identified from the system requirements in Table 1.  The “Environment” 
entity has been included as a placeholder source for unspecified general signals from 
outside the UAS.  The entities in the context diagram are defined in the data 
dictionary of Table 2 and the data flows are defined in Table 3.  Note that in this 
case, the system is defined to include only the hardware and software materiel items.  
Consequently, the operator is considered to be outside the system.  This is not 
necessarily the rule and often a system will be defined to include the human 
elements. 
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Figure 5  Context Diagram for the UAS 
 
4.5 Checking of Requirements Analysis 
Checks were performed on the analysis of the requirements in Table 1.  The purpose 
of these checks was to ensure that the analysis was consistent.  The following 
checks were made: 
• That every row has a unique identifier in column (a); 
• That every requirement is traceable to a paragraph in AC101-1(0) through an 
entry in column (b); 
• That every row is marked as either a requirement or a non-requirement 
(‘TRUE’ or ‘FALSE’ respectively in column (d)); 
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• That every requirement (column (d) = ‘TRUE’) has an appropriate requirement 
type in column (e); and 
• That all non-requirements (column (d) = ‘FALSE’) have an entry of ‘N/A’ in 
column (e). 
4.6 Results of the System Requirements Analysis 
The requirements analysis performed at the system level, as described above, 
produced: 
• Airworthiness regulations text formatted for analysis; 
• Identification of the subset of regulations text which contains requirements; 
• Classification of each requirement according to type; 
• The system context diagram and data dictionary; and 
• Checks on the analysis products. 
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CHAPTER 5 SYSTEM LEVEL FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
This chapter describes the functional analysis performed at the system level.  The 
two purposes of this analysis were, firstly, to identify the implicit functionality required 
in the system, and secondly, to allocate functionality to subsystems. 
5.1 The Functional Analysis Process 
The method used for functional analysis in this work consists of the following steps: 
(a) Create a function for each explicit system level functional requirement; 
(b) Construct a hierarchy of functions; 
(c) Construct functional flow diagrams; 
(d) Iterate around steps (b) and (c), creating functions as needed to produce a 
consistent and logical function hierarchy and functional flow diagrams; 
(e) Create a data dictionary to document the functions; 
(f) Perform conceptual design at the system level to identify subsystems; and 
(g) Allocate functions to subsystems. 
These steps will be described in the following subsections. 
5.2 Explicit System Functionality 
A set of functions was created to implement the explicit system functional 
requirements.  One function for each functional requirement in Table 1 was created.  
This set of functions was rationalised by combining similar functions.  Traceability 
from each function back to its requirement was maintained.  Aggregate functions 
traced to multiple requirements.   
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5.3 The Function Hierarchy 
A hierarchy of functions was created by grouping similar functions. 
High, middle and low level functions were created to complete the structure of the 
hierarchy.  The creation of these functions was necessary because Table 1 contains 
requirements at the system, subsystem and component levels.  For example, 
requirement C283 in Table 1 is a system level requirement that the operator should 
have the capability to turn the AV transponder on and off.  This requires functionality 
to read the operator’s command (function F1.2.10), functionality to control the power 
to the transponder (function F3.2.8) and functionality to communicate the command 
from the operator’s position to the transponder’s position (function F2).  The functions 
which have been created are implicit in the system requirements and have been 
derived from the explicit requirements.  The hierarchy of functions down to level 2 is 
shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6  Function Hierarchy to Level 2 
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The function hierarchy shows how the high level functions of the system are 
composed of lower level functions.  The full function hierarchy diagrams are 
contained in Appendix 4 (CHAPTER 13). 
The hierarchy of functions is also contained in Table 4.  Column (a) contains a 
unique identifier for each function.  The identifier reflects the position of the function 
in the hierarchy and is prefixed with ‘F’ (for function).    Columns (b), (c) and (d) 
contain the functions at levels one, two and three respectively in the hierarchy.  
Column (f) contains the identifier of the requirement(s) which specify the functionality.  
Column (g) contains the number of the AC101-1(0) paragraph which contains the 
requirement.  Aggregate functions have multiple entries in columns (f) and (g).  
Derived functions have no entries in those columns. 
5.4 Functional Flow Diagrams 
Functional flow diagrams were used to assist in the decomposition of functionality 
and the construction of the function hierarchy.  These diagrams are contained in 
Appendix 5 (CHAPTER 14). 
Functional flow diagrams show the sequence of functions during operation of the 
system.  The diagrams are based on the method described in Appendix A.1 of 
Blanchard and Fabrycky (1998).  The purpose and notation of these functional flow 
diagrams are similar to IDEF0 diagrams.  The functional flow diagram notation was 
used in preference to IDEF0 because it serves the same purpose and is more 
efficient to use with standard office drawing tools. 
The functional flow for function F3.0 (Operate AV) is shown in Figure 7 below, to 
illustrate the notation. 
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Figure 7.Functional Flow for Function F3.0 “Operate AV” 
 
The reference block on the left side of Figure 7 with the arrow flowing out indicates a 
connection from another functional flow diagram.  The reference block on the right 
side with the arrow flowing into it indicates a connection to another diagram.  
Functions 3.1 and 3.2 are executed sequentially.  Functions 3.3 and 3.4 are executed 
in parallel with functions 3.1 and 3.2, as indicated by the AND symbol. 
5.5 Initial System Design and the Product Breakdown Structure 
The initial design activity at the system level is to decompose the system into 
subsystems.  The result of this activity is the Product Breakdown Structure (PBS). 
A PBS shows a hierarchical breakdown of a system into subsystems and 
components.  Various references such as Cameron (1995) and Fahlstrom and 
Gleason (1992), provide overviews of UAS.  Any of these system descriptions could 
be used as the basis for a top-level PBS.  Another reference which provides a 
breakdown of a UAS is MIL-HDBK-881A (Work Breakdown Structures for Defense 
Materiel Items 2005).  This could also form the basis of a UAS PBS.  However the 
top-level PBS used here was developed from CASA (2002 paragraph 4.2).  In this 
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reference CASA define a UAS as consisting of the UAV, the ground control system, 
the communications/data link system, the maintenance system and the operating 
personnel (refer ID C14 of Table 1).  The PBS developed from this definition is 
shown at Figure 8.  For the purposes of this research, the personnel are not 
considered as part of the system. 
Uninhabited
Aircraft System
Ground Control
Subsystem
Data Link
Subsystem
Air Vehicle
 Subsystem
 
Figure 8  Product Breakdown Structure (to Level 2) 
The elements of Figure 8 are defined in Table 2. 
These are the top-level elements of a generic UAS.  Many different UAS have 
elements which perform the same function.  For example all UAS include an air 
vehicle as an element of the system.  Different systems may use elements of the 
same type, such as a common hardware or software item.  In general, most of the 
basic elements of a UAS will be found in all UAS.  Hence, a top-level PBS which 
contains all of these basic elements may be defined and will be applicable to many 
specific UAS. 
The UAS PBS is the top level system design and will provide a context for the 
consideration of requirements and functionality.  Creating an arbitrary system design 
at the beginning may be seen as circumventing the systems engineering process, 
since the development of the system structure or architecture is one of the main 
products of that process.  However, it is rare to apply a “pure text book” systems 
engineering process.  In reality, many developments involve concurrent top-down 
and bottom-up engineering to produce a solution. 
 34 
The UAS PBS is necessary for the allocation of requirements and functionality to 
physical subsystems. 
5.6 Function Allocation 
The final step in the functional analysis at the system level for this research was to 
allocate functionality to subsystems defined in the PBS.  The lowest level functions in 
each branch of the function hierarchy were allocated to one or more of the Air 
Vehicle Subsystem (AVS), Data Link Subsystem (DLS) and Ground Control 
Subsystem (GCS).  These allocations are shown in column (e) of Table 4. 
5.7 Results of the System Functional Analysis 
The functional analysis performed at the system level produced: 
• Explicit functionality derived from the system requirements; 
• Implicit functionality; 
• A hierarchy of functions; 
• Functional flow diagrams showing the sequential or parallel nature of each 
function; 
• A high level system Product Breakdown Structure; and 
• An allocation of functionality to PBS subsystems. 
 
 35 
CHAPTER 6 SUBSYSTEM LEVEL ANALYSIS 
6.1 Subsystem Functional Requirements 
Systems engineering is an iterative process which is applied to the system, 
subsystem and component levels in a system.  Analysis at the system level was 
described in CHAPTER 4 and CHAPTER 5.  The starting point for analysis at the 
subsystem level is the definition of subsystem requirements, derived from the system 
level analysis. 
Column (d) of Table 5 contains the subsystem functional requirements derived from 
the system level functional analysis for the level 2 subsystems of Figure 8. 
6.2 Subsystem Conceptual Design 
Conceptual design of the level 2 subsystems was then developed.  The design was 
based upon the required functionality (from the system level analysis) and knowledge 
of the elements of existing UAS.  The subsystem design is expressed as level 3 
elements in the PBS.  This design is shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9  Product Breakdown Structure (to Level 3) 
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6.3 Functional Allocation to Subsystem Components 
The subsystem requirements were allocated to components of the subsystems (i.e. 
the level 3 elements of the PBS).  This allocation is contained in column (e) of Table 
5. 
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION 
This chapter contains discussion of problems and observations made during the 
course of the research. 
7.1 Tools 
The research in this thesis employed standard office tools such as word processors, 
spreadsheets and office drawing packages (Microsoft Word, Excel and Visio).  
Although the result is adequate, the author considers that the result is 
disproportionate to the amount of effort required. 
Any future effort should make use of tools specifically developed for managing 
requirements and performing requirements and functional analyses.  These tools 
should provide a level of automation and specifically, a level of automated checking 
for consistency between the different engineering products. 
7.2 Methodological problems 
It was necessary to limit the scope of the topic to ensure that the research would be 
achievable in the available time.  The scope was limited in a number of ways.  These 
limitations contributed to many of the problems observed during the course of the 
research.  The limitations are evident when the research is reviewed in the context of 
the full scope of systems engineering activities. 
The scope of the research was limited by considering only a single airworthiness 
regulations document.  A complete systems engineering analysis of airworthiness 
requirements would necessarily consider the complete range of documents. 
Only one forward pass from requirements to functions was performed at the system 
level.  At the subsystem level, only a requirements allocation was performed.  A more 
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complete analysis would involve iterative consideration of requirements and 
functionality at each of the system, subsystem and component levels. 
During the requirements analysis activity, only the functional requirements were 
considered in detail.  A full systems engineering analysis requires consideration and 
analysis of all requirements. 
Additional activities such as safety and reliability analyses were not performed.  
These activities would normally generate additional requirements, including 
functional requirements.  These additional requirements would be inputs to a 
subsequent iteration of the requirements analysis activity.  Since these analyses 
were not performed, the additional requirements they would generate are not 
included in the analysis.  Consequently the functional definition of the system is 
known to be incomplete. 
Qualification criteria were not developed for the requirements.  The development of 
qualification criteria is normally performed during requirements analysis.  However, 
qualification criteria add little value to a functional architecture of a generic UAS.  
This is apparent when the reader recalls that the requirements and functional 
analyses are known to be incomplete.  Formal architecture frameworks such the US 
Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) do not contain qualification 
criteria. 
The analysis of requirements and functionality was only performed on airworthiness 
requirements.  No specific operational requirements were considered.  Consequently, 
the resulting functional description is generic.  While this has the advantage of being 
applicable to many systems, more work would be required to apply it to a specific 
system. 
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 Summary 
This thesis has presented a functional description for a generic UAS.  The functional 
description was derived from Australian civil airworthiness requirements (CASA 
2002) through analysis of requirements and functionality. 
The functional description identified the major functions in the system and the 
sequence of execution of functions during system operation. 
8.2 Conclusions 
This research has demonstrated that systems engineering provides a means of 
ensuring that the delivered system meets the customer’s needs.  This is illustrated in 
this thesis by the traceability from functionality back to requirements and from the 
subsystems up to the system level.  The airworthiness regulations provide the 
customer’s requirements in this research. 
The decomposition of functionality has demonstrated that a UAS may be partitioned 
into subsystems with defined interfaces.  This partitioning would allow the system to 
be developed by a distributed team. 
Implementing the requirements analysis and functional analysis methods manually 
was time consuming.  Automated tools would be needed for problems of any 
significant size or complexity. 
A simulation model could be developed based upon the structure of the functional 
architecture. 
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8.3 Follow-On Work 
The generic PBS does not limit the structure or implementation of an actual system.  
Depending on the operational requirements for a specific system, the following 
modifications may be needed to the generic functional description: 
• A separate GCS may be required for each of launch and recovery if these are 
in different locations; 
• Separate GCSs may be required for the launch/recovery and mission phases 
if the distance between the operational mission area and the launch/recovery 
area exceeds the range of data link communications; 
• Command of the UAV may need to be transferred between multiple GCSs 
where the mission area is larger than the range of data link communications; 
• A secondary command and control (C2) data link for redundant command and 
control of the UAV providing additional safety and reliability; 
• The addition of payload functionality; 
• A separate data link for payload data where this is needed in real-time or 
where the amount of data cannot be accommodated by the C2 data link(s); 
• Integrated command and control of flight and payload where there are 
limitations on the number of human operators; 
• Missions may comprise more than one sortie; 
• Data link communications may be relayed between the GCS and UAV by a 
second UAV; 
• UAVs may carry multiple payloads; and 
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• Swarming and cooperative flight. 
The generic functional description will provide the basis for the development of more 
advanced architectures which include these options. 
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CHAPTER 10 APPENDIX 1: REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS OF 
AC101-1(0) 
Table 1 contains the results of the analysis of the system requirements taken from an 
extract of AC101-1(0) (CASA 2002).  The extract includes sections one through 
eight.  Sections nine through 14 and the appendices were not included because they 
cover non-functional (certification, approval and insurance) and support 
(maintenance and training) aspects of a UAS. 
Column (a) contains a unique identifier (pre-fixed with ‘C’ for CASA requirement) for 
each heading, sentence and list member of AC101-1(0). 
Column (b) contains the paragraph number from Ac101-1(0). 
Column (c) contains the heading, sentence or list member text from Ac101-1(0). 
Column (d) indicates whether the text in column (c) is a requirement (TRUE) or not 
(FALSE). 
Column (e) contains the requirement type(s) where column (c) contains a 
requirement or ‘N/A’ where the text is not a requirement.  The requirement types are 
defined in Section 4.3. 
Table 1  Requirements Analysis of Extract of AC101-1(0) 
(a) 
Reqt 
ID 
(b) 
AC101-1(0) 
Para 
(c) 
Object Text 
(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C1 1 1. REFERENCES FALSE N/A 
C2  · CASR Part 101 FALSE N/A 
C3 2 2. PURPOSE FALSE N/A 
C4 2.1 2.1 This Advisory Circular (AC) has been 
developed to provide guidance to controllers 
and manufacturers of UAVs in the operation 
and construction of UAVs and the means 
whereby they may safely and legally operate 
UAV systems. 
FALSE N/A 
C5 2.1 This document also provides guidance to CASA 
staff on the processing of approvals for UAV 
operation. 
FALSE N/A 
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(a) 
Reqt 
ID 
(b) 
AC101-1(0) 
Para 
(c) 
Object Text 
(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C6 2.1 While this document prescribes a means of 
compliance with legislation, alternate 
procedures demonstrating an equivalent or 
greater level of safety may be considered on a 
case by case basis. 
FALSE N/A 
C7 3 3. STATUS OF THIS AC FALSE N/A 
C8 3.1 3.1 This is the first AC to be published on this 
subject. 
FALSE N/A 
C9 4 4. BACKGROUND FALSE N/A 
C10 4.1 4.1 Flight by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
in controlled airspace and over populous areas 
presents problems to the regulator in terms of 
ensuring the safety of other users of airspace 
and persons on the ground. 
FALSE N/A 
C11 4.1 In the past, safety assurance would normally 
have been in the form of a prohibition of such 
activities, however, improvements in the 
technology associated with UAVs means that 
the potential exists for the operators of UAVs to 
comply with any safety imposition imposed by 
the regulator, which will ensure an adequate 
level of safety. 
FALSE N/A 
C12 4.1 The penalties for the operator may be increased 
complexity, increased weight, reduced payload 
and increased cost. 
FALSE N/A 
C13 4.1 In most cases, these factors will render 
commercial operations non-viable, however, as 
costs reduce and miniaturization continues, 
builders of UAVs may soon be able to develop 
cost effective solutions to current constraints. 
FALSE N/A 
C14 4.2 4.2 The UAV comprises not just the aircraft, it 
also consists of the UAV ground control system, 
communications/datalink system, the 
maintenance system and the operating 
personnel. 
FALSE N/A 
C15 4.2 Thus, when considering requests for UAV 
operating approval, the regulator will assess the 
UAV system as a whole. 
FALSE N/A 
C16 4.2 The guidance contained in this advisory circular 
should be considered during development of a 
UAV system. 
FALSE N/A 
C17 5 5. OPERATION OF UAVS IN CONTROLLED 
AIRSPACE 
FALSE N/A 
C18 5.1 5.1 General FALSE N/A 
C19 5.1.1 5.1.1 In general, when operating in controlled 
airspace, UAVs should be operated in 
accordance with the rules governing the flights 
of manned aircraft as specified by the 
appropriate ATS authority. 
TRUE Operational 
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(a) 
Reqt 
ID 
(b) 
AC101-1(0) 
Para 
(c) 
Object Text 
(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C20 5.1.1 UAVs should be able to comply with ATC 
regulations and equipment requirements 
applicable to the class of airspace within which 
they intend to operate. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C21 5.2 5.2 Procedures and Authorisations FALSE N/A 
C22 5.2.1 5.2.1 The procedures and authorisations in this 
Section apply specifically to UAV operations 
within controlled airspace and include 
procedures and authorisations required to 
govern UAV take off, climb, descent, and 
landing. 
FALSE N/A 
C23 5.2.1 These are required to provide for the pre co-
ordination and procedures necessary to safely 
recover a UAV through controlled airspace 
should UAV system failure preclude the ability 
to remain outside controlled airspace. 
FALSE N/A 
C24 5.2.2 5.2.2 These procedures apply specifically to 
those UAVs that can be monitored and 
controlled in real-time from a UAV control 
station. 
FALSE N/A 
C25 5.2.2 Nothing contained in this document is meant to 
preclude operation of a UAV in an 
“autonomous” or programmed flight mode, 
provided that UAV performance and designated 
ATC communication circuits are continuously 
monitored by the UAV operating crew, and that 
the UAV system and crew are capable of 
immediately taking active control of the UAV. 
FALSE N/A 
C26 5.3 5.3 Flight Manual FALSE N/A 
C27 5.3.1 5.3.1 UAV flights in controlled airspace should 
only be conducted if an approved UAV Flight 
Manual is immediately available to the UAV 
controller within the UAV control station. 
TRUE Operational 
C28 5.3.2 5.3.2 CASA may approve flights in controlled 
airspace by non-certificated UAVs. 
FALSE N/A 
C29 5.3.2 In this case, CASA may require availability to 
the controller of reference material appropriate 
to the UAV being operated. 
FALSE N/A 
C30 5.4 5.4 Flight Testing FALSE N/A 
C31 5.4.1 5.4.1 UAV flight testing and certification flights 
should normally be conducted outside 
controlled airspace, however, flights within line 
of sight of the controller may be carried out in 
an approved operating area in accordance with 
an approval issued by CASA subject to ATC 
clearance. 
TRUE Operational 
C32 5.5 5.5 Rules of Operations FALSE N/A 
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(a) 
Reqt 
ID 
(b) 
AC101-1(0) 
Para 
(c) 
Object Text 
(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C33 5.5.1 5.5.1 All flights outside visual sight of the 
controller should be conducted: 
TRUE Operational 
C34 5.5.1a (a) in accordance with conditions specified 
in an approval issued by CASA; 
TRUE Operational 
C35 5.5.1b (b) in an approved operating area; or TRUE Operational 
C36 5.5.1c (c) in a known traffic environment — in 
accordance with regulations governing the flight 
of a manned aircraft. 
TRUE Operational 
C37 5.6 5.6 Flight Notification FALSE N/A 
C38 5.6.1 5.6.1 Where a UAV flight is to be conducted in 
airspace shared with manned aircraft, flight 
notification may be in the form of a NOTAM or 
may be filed in accordance with the normal 
procedures for IFR flight. 
TRUE Operational 
C39 5.6.1 The flight plan should indicate that the aircraft is 
unmanned and provide as much detail as 
possible concerning the nature of the flight. 
TRUE Operational 
C40 5.6.2 5.6.2 The UAV may not enter controlled 
airspace without approval of the controlling 
authority; this would normally be in the form of 
an airways clearance. UAV flight procedures 
when operating within controlled airspace are 
as directed by the controlling authority. 
TRUE Operational 
C41 5.6.3 5.6.3 When the operation of a UAV does not 
involve flight higher than 400 ft AGL or within 
close proximity to an aerodrome, the operator 
may exercise discretion in lodging flight 
notification. 
TRUE Operational 
C42 5.6.3 Where there is doubt, the operator should seek 
guidance from CASA. 
TRUE Operational 
C43 5.7 5.7 Collision Avoidance FALSE N/A 
C44 5.7.1 5.7.1 Unless the controller of a UAV is provided 
with sufficient visual cues to enable the 
acquisition and avoidance of other air traffic, 
UAV flights in controlled airspace will be treated 
as IFR flights, subject to ATC control. 
TRUE Operational 
C45 5.7.2 5.7.2 CASA may require a large UAV to be 
equipped with an SSR transponder, a collision 
avoidance system or forward looking television 
as appropriate for the type of operation. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C46 5.8 5.8 Noise Abatement FALSE N/A 
C47 5.8.1 5.8.1 UAVs should follow applicable local noise 
abatement procedures at their launch and 
recovery sites such as operating hours, directed 
flight paths/altitudes, etc., consistent with safe 
operation of the UAV. 
TRUE Operational 
C48 5.9 5.9 Take off and Landing FALSE N/A 
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(a) 
Reqt 
ID 
(b) 
AC101-1(0) 
Para 
(c) 
Object Text 
(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C49 5.9.1 5.9.1 When a UAV is operated at an aerodrome 
normally used by manned aircraft, take off and 
landing should be in accordance with normal 
procedures and the UAV should follow ATC 
instructions unless otherwise authorized. 
TRUE Operational 
C50 5.9.2 5.9.2 For UAVs, which are manually controlled 
for, take off by the launch controller, VFR 
procedures, local airfield pattern regulation, and 
VFR weather minimums for the class of 
airspace will apply. 
TRUE Operational 
C51 5.9.2 After take off, the launch controller should 
manoeuvre the UAV as required to maintain 
visual contact. 
TRUE Operational 
C52 5.9.2 During take off and evolution from direct to 
autonomous control, the UAV system must be 
monitored by the UAV supervising controller to 
verify UAV system status and compliance with 
navigational and flight path clearances. 
TRUE Operational 
C53 5.9.2 The supervising controller is responsible during 
this phase for collision avoidance but should 
allow the launch controller to manoeuvre the 
UAV as directed by ATC under IFR procedures. 
TRUE Operational 
C54 5.9.3 5.9.3 For UAVs, which are manually controlled 
for landing by the launch controller, VFR 
procedures, local airfields pattern regulations, 
and VFR weather minimums for the class of 
airspace, will apply. 
TRUE Operational 
C55 5.9.3 The UAV should be flown according to ATC 
instruction with traffic separation provided by 
ATC, to a pre-designated recovery point, 
entering a holding pattern until visual sight of 
the UAV is acquired by the supervising 
controller. 
TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C56 5.9.3 At this point, the supervising controller assumes 
responsibility for traffic separation and collision 
avoidance. 
TRUE Operational 
C57 5.9.3 The supervising controller should monitor the 
recovery evolution to manual control to verify 
UAV performance and compliance with 
navigational and flight path clearances. 
TRUE Operational 
C58 5.9.4 5.9.4 For UAVs equipped with automatic take 
off and landing systems, the supervising 
controller should monitor UAV system status 
and compliance with ATC clearances, making 
flight path corrections as required and/or 
directed by ATC. 
TRUE Operational 
C59 5.1 5.10 Emergency Procedures FALSE N/A 
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(a) 
Reqt 
ID 
(b) 
AC101-1(0) 
Para 
(c) 
Object Text 
(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C60 5.10.1 5.10.1 The UAV flight plan should include 
information and procedures regarding pre-
planned emergency flight profiles in the event 
positive data link control of the UAV is lost. 
TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C61 5.10.1 Dependent on system capabilities, these 
profiles could include: 
FALSE N/A 
C62 5.10.1a (a) UAV autonomous transit to a pre-
designated recovery area followed by an 
autonomous recovery; 
TRUE Functional 
C63 5.10.1b (b) UAV autonomous transit to a pre-
designated recovery area followed by activation 
of a flight termination system (FTS). 
TRUE Functional 
C64 5.10.2 5.10.2 Abort Procedures. FALSE N/A 
C65 5.10.2 Specific abort and flight termination procedures 
should be developed by the supervising UAV 
controller, and should be briefed to ATC as 
required. 
TRUE Operational 
C66 5.10.2 At a minimum, information regarding pre-
programmed loss-of-link flight profile (including 
termination actions should the control link not 
be re-established), flight termination 
capabilities, and UAV performance under 
termination conditions should be briefed. 
TRUE Operational 
C67 5.10.3 5.10.3 The data link should be continuously and 
automatically checked and a real time warning 
should be displayed to the UAV crew in case of 
failure. 
TRUE Functional 
C68 5.10.3 In case of loss of data link other than 
intermittent loss of signal or during programmed 
periods of outage, SSR 7700 code should be 
squawked both automatically and manually by 
the UAV controller and emergency recovery 
procedures should be executed. 
TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C69 5.10.3 The parameters, which determine acceptable 
intermittent loss of signal and total loss, will be 
set by the manufacturer. 
TRUE Performance 
C70 5.10.3 A UAV, which has lost total control data link and 
is conducting an autonomous pre-programmed 
flight profile to termination or recovery will be 
handled by ATC as an emergency aircraft. 
TRUE Operational 
C71 5.10.4 5.10.4 In the event of communications failure 
between the supervising UAV controller and 
ATC, the UAV should squawk SSR code 7600 
(mode 3A) and attempt to establish alternate 
communications. 
TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
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ID 
(b) 
AC101-1(0) 
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(c) 
Object Text 
(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C72 5.10.4 Pending reestablishment of communications 
with ATC, the UAV will be controlled in 
accordance with last acknowledged instruction 
or should be commanded to orbit in its current 
position. 
TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C73 5.10.4 If communications with ATC are not re-
established, the UAV sortie should be aborted. 
TRUE Operational 
C74 5.11 5.11 Meteorological Conditions FALSE N/A 
C75 5.11.1 5.11.1 Weather minimums for UAV flight should 
be determined by the equipment and 
capabilities of each specific UAV system, the 
qualifications of the supervising controller and 
the class of airspace in which the flight is 
conducted. 
TRUE Operational 
C76 5.11.2 5.11.2 Icing Conditions. FALSE N/A 
C77 5.11.2 UAVs should not be flown in conditions where 
icing may form without proper anti-ice/de-icing 
equipment. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint; 
Operational 
C78 5.11.3 5.11.3 Visibility. FALSE N/A 
C79 5.11.3 For UAVs operating under VFR procedures for 
launch and recovery, visibility requirements are 
as defined for the type of airspace, but in no 
case less than 5 km and 1000 foot ceiling. 
TRUE Operational 
C80 5.11.3 For UAV systems equipped with an internal 
automatic precision landing aid such as those 
based on the Global Positioning Systems 
(GPS), weather minimums should be sufficient 
for an external observer to visually verify the 
UAV flight path and alert the UAV controllers of 
unsatisfactory landing approach in sufficient 
time to execute a missed approach; as such, 
minimum visibility is dependent on UAV 
approach speed, size, and performance 
capabilities. 
TRUE Operational 
C81 5.12 5.12 Co-ordination/Authorisation with CASA FALSE N/A 
C82 5.12.1 5.12.1 Subject to review, CASA may approve 
UAV systems for operations within published 
guidelines. 
FALSE N/A 
C83 5.12.1 The review will include but not be limited to UAV 
certification, controller qualification, flight 
planning, weather minima, installed equipment 
and maintenance procedures. 
FALSE N/A 
C84 5.12.1 Operations outside published guidelines will 
require special approval on a case-by-case 
basis. 
FALSE N/A 
C85 5.12.2 5.12.2 Local Operations. FALSE N/A 
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AC101-1(0) 
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(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C86 5.12.2 Prior to the commencement of UAV operations, 
UAV operating personnel should establish Local 
Operating Procedures for UAV operations with 
the appropriate ATS authority. 
TRUE Operational 
C87 5.12.2 Specific procedures should be established for 
ground UAV operations, flight plan filing 
procedures, integration of UAVs into local traffic 
pattern, UAV take off and landing procedures, 
local airspace restrictions, noise abatement 
procedures, right-of-way rules, communications 
requirements, and UAV emergency procedures. 
TRUE Operational 
C88 5.12.2 Designated “safe areas” will be established for 
emergency UAV holding and flight termination. 
TRUE Operational 
C89 5.13 5.13 Interfacing with Air Traffic Services FALSE N/A 
C90 5.13.1 5.13.1 UAVs operating within radar controlled 
airspace should be equipped with a SSR 
transponder capable of operating in modes 3 A 
and C. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C91 5.13.1 The supervising UAV controller should have the 
capability to change the SSR code and squawk 
identification when required. 
TRUE Functional 
C92 5.13.2 5.13.2 Flight Deviations. All requests for flight 
deviations should be made by established 
procedures to the appropriate ATS authorities. 
TRUE Operational 
C93 5.13.3 5.13.3 Communications. The supervising UAV 
controller should initiate and maintain two way 
communications with the appropriate ATC 
authorities for the duration of any flight. 
TRUE Operational 
C94 5.13.4 5.13.4 Position Reporting. FALSE N/A 
C95 5.13.4 UAVs operating in controlled airspace should be 
continuously monitored for adherence to the 
approved flight plan by the supervising UAV 
controller. 
TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C96 5.13.4 The supervising UAV controller should make all 
position and other required reports to the 
appropriate ATC unit. 
TRUE Operational 
C97 5.13.4 Automatic Dependent Surveillance systems 
(ADS) may be suitable for this purpose. 
FALSE N/A 
C98 5.13.5 5.13.5 Tracking. FALSE N/A 
C99 5.13.5 Where radar coverage is provided, ATC will 
continuously monitor the flight path of the UAV. 
FALSE N/A 
C100 5.13.5 Outside of radar coverage, CASA may require 
the fitment of additional equipment to facilitate 
tracking of the UAV and separation from other 
aircraft. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
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C101 5.13.5 ADS or similar equipment may be suitable for 
this purpose. 
FALSE N/A 
C102 5.13.6 5.13.6 UAV Identification. FALSE N/A 
C103 5.13.6 Each UAV flight should have some means of 
informing ATC that the flight is unmanned. 
TRUE Operational 
C104 5.13.6 Therefore, all UAV call signs should include the 
word 'UNMANNED'. 
TRUE Operational 
C105 5.14 5.14 Line-of-Sight Operations FALSE N/A 
C106 5.14.1 5.14.1 For purposes of UAV operations within 
controlled airspace, 'line-of sight' refers to visual 
versus radio data link line-of-sight. 
TRUE Operational 
C107 5.14.1  Accordingly, the only applicability to operations 
as discussed in this document is to the take off 
and landing phase. 
FALSE N/A 
C108 5.14.1a (a) Mission Briefing. FALSE N/A 
C109 5.14.1a The following information should be included in 
any flight authorisation requests and flight plans 
when applicable. 
TRUE Operational 
C110 5.14.1a When UAV take off and landing is to be 
accomplished by a launch controller under 
visual conditions, the supervising UAV controller 
should ensure appropriate airport/ATC 
personnel are briefed on the specific evolution 
of control to be conducted and are aware of the 
specific UAV operating procedures required. 
TRUE Operational 
C111 5.14.1a  In addition to the information required for the 
flight plan, procedures for UAV taxi, take off, 
separation, local traffic pattern restrictions, 
controller hand-over, departure, abort to 
recovery, and flight termination should be 
briefed. 
TRUE Operational 
C112 5.14.1b (b) Communication Requirements. FALSE N/A 
C113 5.14.1b Communication requirements for UAV line-of-
sight operations are as required for the class of 
airspace in which the flight will occur. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint; 
Operational 
C114 5.14.1b When the flight controller is not co-located with 
the launch controller, the launch and recovery 
control station as well as the primary UAV 
control station must have established 
communications with ATC authorities 
responsible for the area of flight prior to 
commencement of flight. 
TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C115 5.15 5.15 Operations Beyond Line-of-Sight FALSE N/A 
C116 5.15.1 5.15.1 Mission Briefing. The following 
information should be included in any flight 
authorization requests and flight plans when 
applicable. 
TRUE Operational 
C117 5.15.2 5.15.2 Performance Requirements. FALSE N/A 
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C118 5.15.2 Any performance requirements or limitations 
unique to the UAV should be provided to the 
ATC unit as appropriate prior to the flight. 
TRUE Operational 
C119 5.15.2  The pilot in command should not request any 
clearance (i.e. SID, precision approach, altitude, 
holding pattern) that the UAV is not capable of 
executing within its approved flight envelope. 
TRUE Operational 
C120 5.15.3 5.15.3 Abort Procedures. FALSE N/A 
C121 5.15.3 Specific abort and flight termination procedures 
should be developed by the supervising UAV 
controller, and should be provided to ATC as 
required. 
TRUE Operational 
C122 5.15.3 At a minimum, information regarding pre-
programmed loss-of-link flight profile (including 
terminal actions should the control link not be 
re-established), flight termination capabilities, 
and UAV performance under termination 
conditions should be briefed. 
TRUE Operational 
C123 5.15.4 5.15.4 Direct Communications Required. FALSE N/A 
C124 5.15.4 Communications between the supervising UAV 
controller and the controlling ATC authority 
should be as required for the class of airspace 
in which operations occur. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint; 
Operational 
C125 5.15.4 The UAV control station should utilize a 
communications architecture, which interfaces 
with existing ATC communications equipment 
and procedures, so that the fact that the 
supervising UAV controller is on the ground is 
transparent to ATC personnel. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C126 5.15.4 Upon check-in with ATC personnel, the 
supervising controller should request a direct 
telephone number for ATC for contingency use 
should radio communications fail. 
TRUE Operational 
C127 5.15.5 5.15.5 Chase Plane Requirements. FALSE N/A 
C128 5.15.5 Chase planes are not required for UAVs 
operating in controlled airspace when on 
approved IFR flight plans and in accordance 
with the procedures outlined in this AC. 
TRUE Operational 
C129 5.15.5 During flights or portions of flights under IFR 
procedures if a chase plane is utilized, the 
chase plane must be incorporated into the IFR 
flight plan. 
TRUE Operational 
C130 5.15.5 In such a case, the flight will be classified as a 
formation flight, and will have the same right-of-
way status as aircraft engaged in towing. 
TRUE Operational 
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C131 5.15.5 A chase plane should not be utilized in 
conjunction with UAV IFR flight operations when 
VFR conditions applicable for the class of 
airspace cannot be maintained. 
TRUE Operational 
C132 5.15.6 5.15.6 Qualification of the Supervising UAV 
Controller. At a minimum, the supervising UAV 
controller should have completed the ground 
training applicable to the issue of an instrument 
rating in order to operate UAVs in controlled 
airspace under an IFR clearance. 
TRUE Operational 
C133 5.16 5.16 Operation of Equipment FALSE N/A 
C134 5.16.1 5.16.1 Equipment Requirements. The following 
equipment should be fitted and operable prior to 
a flight under IFR procedures: 
TRUE Operational 
C135 5.16.1a (a) Position Lights. These lights should 
normally be turned on at all times the UAV is in 
motion including taxi, takeoff, flight, and landing, 
unless otherwise approved by CASA. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C136 5.16.1b (b) Anti-Collision Lights. These lights 
should normally be turned on at all times the 
UAV is in flight unless otherwise directed by 
CASA. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C137 5.16.1c (c) Transponder. The supervising controller 
should have the capability to turn the 
transponder on and off, manually select codes, 
and squawk and identification as directed, while 
the UAV is airborne. 
TRUE Functional 
C138 5.16.1d (d) Radios. UAV communication 
architecture should allow the supervising UAV 
controller to communicate with the ATC facilities 
controlling the UAV regardless of its location. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C139 5.16.1e (e) Acquisition light. The light should be 
operable on command as an aid to identification 
of the UAV. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C140 5.16.2 5.16.2 UAV System and Attitude Displays. The 
UAV system should be capable of displaying to 
the supervising controller all aircraft system and 
attitude information necessary for safe 
operation, control, and navigation. 
TRUE Functional; 
Safety 
C141 5.16.3 5.16.3 Flight and Voice Recorder. FALSE N/A 
C142 5.16.3 Where recording systems are required by CASA 
to record UAV systems and navigational status, 
and radio and intercom voice communications, 
such systems should be operable for the 
duration of the flight. 
TRUE Performance 
C143 5.16.3 This system will normally be installed within the 
UAV control station. 
FALSE N/A 
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C144 5.16.4 5.16.4 Flight Termination. UAVs should not 
operate within controlled airspace without an 
operable flight termination system or a system 
which provides autonomous recovery to a 
predetermined recovery area following failure to 
maintain safe flight control or operation within 
parameters agreed by the operators and CASA. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint; 
Operational 
C145 6 6. OPERATION OF UAVS OVER POPULOUS 
AREAS 
FALSE N/A 
C146 6.1 6.1 General FALSE N/A 
C147 6.1.1 6.1.1 The paramount factor to be addressed 
when considering flight by UAVs over populous 
areas is the safety of people and property on 
the ground. 
FALSE N/A 
C148 6.1.1 The risk of injury or damage resulting from the 
crash of a UAV is dependent upon a variety of 
factors: 
FALSE N/A 
C149 6.1.1a (a) mass of the UAV; FALSE N/A 
C150 6.1.1b (b) composition of the UAV; FALSE N/A 
C151 6.1.1c (c) velocity of the UAV at impact. FALSE N/A 
C152 6.1.2 6.1.2 The potential of the UAV to crash is also 
dependent upon a variety of factors: 
FALSE N/A 
C153 6.1.2a (a) integrity of the airframe; FALSE N/A 
C154 6.1.2b (b) reliability of the engine; FALSE N/A 
C155 6.1.2c (c) reliability of control systems; FALSE N/A 
C156 6.1.2d (d) reliability of the control communications 
system; 
FALSE N/A 
C157 6.1.2e (e) ability of the controller. FALSE N/A 
C158 6.1.3 6.1.3 CASA is charged with the responsibility of 
ensuring the safety of flying operations, the 
following guidance in this section has been 
developed for that purpose. 
FALSE N/A 
C159 6.2 6.2 Procedures and Authorisation FALSE N/A 
C160 6.2.1 6.2.1 The procedures and authorisations in this 
Section apply specifically to UAV operations 
over populous areas and are additional to any 
requirements specified in Section 5 where 
populous areas and controlled airspace are 
coincident. 
FALSE N/A 
C161 6.2.2 6.2.2 These procedures apply specifically to 
those UAVs that can be monitored and 
controlled in real-time from a UAV control 
station or which are operated by line of sight 
control. 
FALSE N/A 
C162 6.2.2 Nothing herein is meant to preclude operation of 
a UAV in an 'autonomous' or programmed flight 
mode, provided that UAV navigation 
performance can be continuously monitored by 
the UAV controllers, and that the UAV system 
and crew are capable of immediately taking 
active control of the UAV. 
FALSE N/A 
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C163 6.3 6.3 Flight Manual FALSE N/A 
C164 6.3.1 6.3.1 UAV flights over populous areas should 
be conducted only if an approved UAV Flight 
Manual is immediately available to the 
supervising UAV controller within the UAV 
control station. (See paragraph 5.3). 
TRUE Operational 
C165 6.4 6.4 Flight Testing FALSE N/A 
C166 6.4.1 6.4.1 UAV flight testing and certification may not 
be carried out over populous areas. 
TRUE Operational 
C167 6.5 6.5 Rules of Operations FALSE N/A 
C168 6.5.1 6.5.1 UAV flights over populous areas may not 
be conducted except: 
TRUE Operational 
C169 6.5.1a (a) by a UAV certificated for such flight; 
and 
TRUE Operational 
C170 6.5.1b (b) in accordance with conditions specified 
in an approval issued by CASA; or 
TRUE Operational 
C171 6.5.1c (c) at an altitude which would allow the 
UAV to clear the area in the event of engine 
failure. 
TRUE Operational 
C172 6.5.2 6.5.2 Generally, the requirement for certification 
will limit flights over populous areas to large 
UAVs, however, the designer of a small UAV 
may apply for a type certificate subject to the 
requirements of CAR 1998 Part 21 and 
accompanying advisory material. Provided that 
the aircraft meets CASA's requirements, the 
UAV may be eligible for certification. 
FALSE N/A 
C173 6.6 6.6 Noise Abatement FALSE N/A 
C174 6.6.1 6.6.1 UAVs should follow the principles of noise 
abatement procedures during flight over 
populous areas consistent with safe operation 
of the UAV. 
TRUE Operational 
C175 6.7 6.7 Emergency Procedures FALSE N/A 
C176 6.7.1 6.7.1 The UAV flight plan should include 
procedures to be followed in the event of: 
TRUE Operational 
C177 6.7.1a (a) engine failure; TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C178 6.7.1b (b) loss of data link; TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C179 6.7.1c (c) loss of control; TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C180 6.7.1d (d) failure of navigation; TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
C181 6.7.1e (e) airframe damage. TRUE Functional; 
Operational 
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C182 6.7.2 6.7.2 Emergency procedures may include the 
use of recovery devices, such as parachutes, 
where a failure subjects persons or property to 
immediate danger or, where the immediate risk 
of hazard from failure is minimal: 
TRUE Operational 
C183 6.7.2a (a) UAV autonomous transit to a pre-
designated recovery area followed by an 
autonomous recovery; 
TRUE Functional 
C184 6.7.2b (b) UAV autonomous transit to a pre-
designated recovery area followed by activation 
of a flight termination system. 
TRUE Functional 
C185 7 7. UAV OPERATION OVER UNPOPULATED 
AREAS 
FALSE N/A 
C186 7.1 7.1 Small UAVs FALSE N/A 
C187 7.1.1 7.1.1 Provided that a small UAV is operated not 
above 400ft AGL and remains clear of 
designated airspace, aerodromes and populous 
areas, there are no restrictions imposed upon 
the operation of a small UAV. 
TRUE Operational 
C188 7.1.1 The operator is responsible for ensuring that the 
UAV is operated safely and remains clear of 
potential low level traffic, structures, powerlines 
etc, except where operation in close proximity is 
part of an operation authorised on the 
operator's operating certificate. 
TRUE Operational 
C189 7.1.1 The operator should consider the benefit of a 
thorough reconnaissance of the proposed route 
beforehand. 
TRUE Operational 
C190 7.1.2 7.1.2 Where a person wishes to operate a small 
UAV above 400ft AGL, that person must do so 
in accordance with conditions imposed by 
CASA. Such conditions may specify: 
TRUE Operational 
C191 7.1.2a (a) maximum altitudes; TRUE Operational 
C192 7.1.2b (b) communication requirements; TRUE Operational 
C193 7.1.2c (c) operating times; TRUE Operational 
C194 7.1.2d (d) operating area limitations; TRUE Operational 
C195 7.1.2e (e) UAV equipment etc. TRUE Operational 
C196 7.2 7.2 Large UAVs FALSE N/A 
C197 7.2.1 7.2.1 A person wishing to operate a large UAV 
may only do so if it has been issued with 
Certificate of Registration and either an 
Experimental certificate or a certificate of 
airworthiness in the Restricted category and is 
operated in accordance with an approval issued 
by CASA. 
TRUE Operational 
C198 8 8. DESIGN SPECIFICATION FOR UAV 
SYSTEMS 
FALSE N/A 
 63 
(a) 
Reqt 
ID 
(b) 
AC101-1(0) 
Para 
(c) 
Object Text 
(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C199 8.1 8.1 General FALSE N/A 
C200 8.1.1 8.1.1 A UAV system comprises both airborne 
and ground based equipment and should be 
designed to minimize the potential for a failure 
of any component to prevent continued safe 
flight and recovery of the UAV. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C201 8.1.1 Because of the wide range of airborne vehicles 
and ground stations which potentially form part 
of a UAV system and the wide diversity of 
possible operations, some design criteria may 
apply to all UAV systems and some may be 
unique to a type or class of UAV. 
FALSE N/A 
C202 8.1.1 Thus, the potential developer of a UAV system 
is encouraged to consult with CASA prior to 
commencement of a project. 
FALSE N/A 
C203 8.1.1 The following design criteria are for general 
guidance only. 
FALSE N/A 
C204 8.1.2 8.1.2 The guidance pertains to the design of 
seven critical UAV subsystems for operations 
outside of an approved operating area: 
FALSE N/A 
C205 8.1.2a (a) flight control; FALSE N/A 
C206 8.1.2b (b) electrical; FALSE N/A 
C207 8.1.2c (c) communications/data link; FALSE N/A 
C208 8.1.2d (d) navigation; FALSE N/A 
C209 8.1.2e (e) propulsion; FALSE N/A 
C210 8.1.2f (f) UAV control station; FALSE N/A 
C211 8.1.2g (g) flight termination. FALSE N/A 
C212 8.2 8.2 Design Criteria FALSE N/A 
C213 8.2.1 8.2.1 Flight control design should facilitate 
control of the UAV by the controller and provide 
unambiguous operations and clear indications 
of UAV flight status. 
TRUE Functional 
C214 8.2.1 Design criteria should minimise the potential for 
human error. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C215 8.2.1 All flight indications and warnings necessary to 
ensure safe control of the UAV flight path 
should be provided. 
TRUE Safety 
C216 8.2.1 In particular, the supervising controller should 
be informed of any degraded mode of 
operations due to any failure, including cases in 
which there is an automatic switching to an 
alternate or degraded mode of operation. 
TRUE Functional 
C217 8.2.1 The control station should include a diagnostic 
and monitoring capability for the status of the 
vehicle. 
TRUE Functional 
C218 8.2.1 Real time, direct communications/surveillance, 
and continuous data transmission capability 
should be provided. 
TRUE Functional 
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C219 8.2.2 8.2.2 A UAV system should incorporate a fail-
safe flight termination system (FTS) or 
autonomous recovery system (ARS), which 
provides recovery to a predetermined recovery 
area. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C220 8.2.2 This system should operate on demand or 
automatically following failure to maintain safe 
flight control or operation within parameters 
agreed by the operators and CASA. 
TRUE Functional 
C221 8.2.2 The need for this feature will be given greater 
emphasis where operations are planned over or 
close to populous areas or where they will be 
within or close to controlled airspace. 
FALSE N/A 
C222 8.2.2 Less emphasis on a FTS/ARS will be accorded 
for those UAVs operating in remote areas. 
FALSE N/A 
C223 8.3 8.3 Safety Standards FALSE N/A 
C224 8.3.1 8.3.1 UAV operations should be as safe as 
manned aircraft insofar as they should not 
present or create a hazard to persons or 
property in the air or on the ground greater than 
that created by manned aircraft of equivalent 
class or category. 
TRUE Safety 
C225 8.4 8.4 Registration FALSE N/A 
C226 8.4.1 8.4.1 CASA requires the operator of a large 
UAV to hold a certificate of registration for the 
aircraft and to maintain the information required 
for compilation of UAV reliability and failure 
rates. 
TRUE Operational 
C227 8.4.2 8.4.2 Although a small UAV is exempt from the 
requirement for registration, each UAV should 
have affixed to it a durable identification plate 
inscribed with appropriate marks to identify 
ownership and identity of the particular aircraft. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C228 8.5 8.5 Technical Issues and Related Criteria FALSE N/A 
C229 8.5.1 8.5.1 Proven fail-safe principles will govern the 
design of UAV systems. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C230 8.5.1 System independence and adequate 
redundancy and back-up features should 
provide for safe functioning of the UAV in the 
event of a system failure. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C231 8.5.1 Redundancy of system management functions 
also should be built into the system. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C232 8.5.1 A description of what constitutes 'fail-safe' 
design appears at Appendix 2. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C233 8.5.2 8.5.2 UAV system design should provide for a 
failure detection apparatus (pre-flight and in-
flight built-in-test) that will immediately notify the 
supervising controller of a system failure. 
TRUE Functional 
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C234 8.5.2 Adequate provision for the safe operation of the 
UAV following a system failure should be 
provided. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C235 8.5.2 Potential human UAV controller errors should 
be considered by UAV designers and adequate 
provisions should be taken to minimize the 
effects of such errors. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C236 8.5.2 Additionally, an engineering analysis of any 
UAV design should be submitted to CASA to 
assist in the further review of UAV design 
criteria. 
TRUE Certification 
C237 8.5.2  The following are considered critical system 
design criteria for UAVs. 
FALSE N/A 
C238 8.5.3 8.5.3 Software. FALSE N/A 
C239 8.5.3 All UAV system software should be verified and 
validated in accordance with RTCA document 
DO-178B or equivalent. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C240 8.5.3 Safety critical software may be subject to 
additional verification by CASA. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C241 8.5.4 8.5.4 Flight Management System. FALSE N/A 
C242 8.5.4 The flight management system includes UAV 
controller controls, sensors, computers and 
actuation parts necessary to control the UAV. 
FALSE N/A 
C243 8.5.4 Any single failure of the flight control system 
should not affect the ability to control UAV 
recovery. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C244 8.5.4 Provisions for possible reversion to degraded 
modes of operation also should be incorporated 
into flight management system design. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C245 8.5.4 Provision for continued control of the UAV 
should be made in the event of a propulsion or 
power generation system failure. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C246 8.5.5 8.5.5 Electrical System. FALSE N/A 
C247 8.5.5 The electrical system should provide sufficient 
power and endurance to ensure safe operations 
and recovery throughout all phases of flight 
even in the event of an emergency. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C248 8.5.5 Consideration should be given to the ability to 
shed non-essential load in the event of a power 
generation failure. 
TRUE Functional 
C249 8.5.5 Similar considerations apply to the ground 
control station. 
TRUE Functional 
C250 8.5.6 8.5.6 Communications System/Data Link. FALSE N/A 
C251 8.5.6 Approval for all frequencies used in UAV 
operations must be obtained from national 
authorities. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C252 8.5.6 Data link signal strength should be continuously 
monitored and appropriate maximum data link 
range cues should be provided to the 
supervising controller. 
TRUE Functional 
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C253 8.5.6 Any single failure of the communications system 
(uplink or downlink) should not affect normal 
control of the UAV. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C254 8.5.6 Uplinks/downlinks are sensitive to 
electromagnetic interference (EMI) and should 
be adequately protected from this hazard. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C255 8.5.6 Provisions for direct communications between 
the supervising controller and the appropriate 
ATC via two way radio should be incorporated 
in the system design. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C256 8.5.7 8.5.7 Navigation System. FALSE N/A 
C257 8.5.7 The UAV navigation system should meet the 
required navigation performance standards of 
the flight rules and the specific requirements for 
the airspace in which the operations are to be 
conducted. 
TRUE Performance 
C258 8.5.7 Only navigation systems meeting the 
requirements for 'sole means navigation' will 
normally be considered for flights under IFR and 
in controlled airspace. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C259 8.5.8 8.5.8 Propulsion System. All essential elements 
of the propulsion system should meet required 
reliability standards as approved by CASA. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C260 8.5.9 8.5.9 UAV Control Station. FALSE N/A 
C261 8.5.9 In its simplest form, the UAV control station may 
consist of a hand held transmitter incorporating 
basic flight controls and rudimentary displays 
similar to those of a model aircraft. 
FALSE N/A 
C262 8.5.9 Control stations for UAV operations beyond line 
of sight should include controls and displays for 
aircraft attitude and performance, propulsion, 
navigation, aircraft systems and sensor 
operation as well as flight system and voice 
recording equipment. 
TRUE Functional 
C263 8.5.9 CASA will assess the control station against the 
requirement to assure the safety of air 
navigation of the UAV. 
FALSE N/A 
C264 8.5.10 8.5.10 UAV Structure. FALSE N/A 
C265 8.5.10 UAV aircraft structure should be designed to 
withstand the maximum expected operational 
loads as determined by the intended operational 
flight envelope of the UAV. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C266 8.5.10 Structural design of small UAVs should meet 
the standards applicable to the construction of 
model aircraft of the same weight category, 
which may be obtained from the Model Aircraft 
Association of Australia (MAAA). 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
 67 
(a) 
Reqt 
ID 
(b) 
AC101-1(0) 
Para 
(c) 
Object Text 
(d) 
Is A 
Reqt? 
(e) 
Reqt Type 
C267 8.5.10 Large UAVs should comply with the appropriate 
design requirements advised by letter in 
accordance with CAR 1998 Part 21. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C268 8.5.11 8.5.11 Flight Termination System. FALSE N/A 
C269 8.5.11 A UAV system should incorporate a fail-safe 
flight termination system (FTS) or autonomous 
recovery system (ARS), which provides 
recovery to a predetermined recovery area. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C270 8.5.11 This system should operate on demand or 
automatically following failure to maintain safe 
flight control or operation within parameters 
agreed by the operators and CASA. 
TRUE Functional 
C271 8.5.11 The need for this feature will be given greater 
emphasis where operations are planned over or 
close to populous areas or where they will be 
within or close to controlled airspace. 
FALSE N/A 
C272 8.5.11 Less emphasis on a FTS/ARS will be accorded 
for those UAVs operating in remote areas. 
FALSE N/A 
C273 8.6 8.6 Equipment requirements FALSE N/A 
C274 8.6.1 8.6.1 The following equipment and instrument 
capabilities should be installed on the UAV 
and/or be available to the supervising controller 
in order to comply with the requirements for 
safe flight under IFR procedures: 
TRUE Operational 
C275 8.6.1a (a) Position Lights. FALSE N/A 
C276 8.6.1a UAVs should have position lights installed as 
required. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C277 8.6.1a The UAV supervising controller may be given 
the capability to turn these lights on and off 
while the UAV is airborne, however they will 
normally be turned on at all times the UAV is in 
motion including taxi, takeoff, flight, and landing, 
unless otherwise directed by CASA. 
TRUE Functional 
C278 8.6.1b (b) Anti-Collision Lights. FALSE N/A 
C279 8.6.1b UAVs should have strobe lights installed as 
required. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C280 8.6.1b The UAV supervising controller may be given 
the capability to turn these lights on and off 
while the UAV is airborne, however they will 
normally be turned on at all times the UAV is in 
flight unless otherwise directed by CASA. 
TRUE Functional 
C281 8.6.1c (c) Transponder. FALSE N/A 
C282 8.6.1c For operation in controlled airspace, and where 
otherwise required by CASA, UAVs should have 
an operable SSR transponder installed. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
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C283 8.6.1c The supervising controller should have the 
capability to turn the transponder on and off, 
manually select codes, and squawk and 
identification as directed, while the UAV is 
airborne. 
TRUE Functional 
C284 8.6.1c CASA may approve operation without in-flight 
resettable SSR codes and identification 
capability on a case by-case basis. 
FALSE N/A 
C285 8.6.1d (d) Radios. FALSE N/A 
C286 8.6.1d The supervising controller should have full and 
immediate access to two way radios within the 
UAV control station as required to maintain 
communications. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C287 8.6.1d UAV communication architecture will be 
designed to allow the supervising controller to 
communicate with the ATC facilities and UAV 
ground crews controlling the UAV regardless of 
their location. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C288 8.6.1e (e) Navigation Systems. FALSE N/A 
C289 8.6.1e Navigational information should be available to 
the supervising controller in a format required 
for reporting in accordance with ATC 
requirements. 
TRUE Design 
Constraint 
C290 8.6.1f (f) UAV System and Attitude Displays. FALSE N/A 
C291 8.6.1f The UAV system should display to the 
supervising controller all aircraft system and 
attitude information required for safe operation, 
control, and navigation. 
TRUE Safety 
C292 8.6.1g (g) Flight and Voice Recorder. FALSE N/A 
C293 8.6.1g CASA may require the UAV system to have a 
recorder to record UAV systems and 
navigational status, and radio and intercom 
voice communications. 
TRUE Functional 
C294 8.6.1g This recorder will normally be installed within 
the UAV control station. 
FALSE N/A 
C295 8.6.1h (h) Built-in Test. FALSE N/A 
C296 8.6.1h Some aircraft may require procedures designed 
to exercise critical components and systems 
and provide an indication of their state of health 
together with an appropriate display. 
TRUE Functional 
C297 8.6.1h This information may be available to the ground 
station during flight. 
TRUE Performance 
C298 8.6.1h A set of diagnostic procedures should also be 
included to aid fault location. 
TRUE Operational 
C299 8.6.1h For in-flight use this should include remaining 
emergency power reserve. 
TRUE Functional 
 
The following sections of AC101-1(0) are not included in Table 1: 
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• Section 9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Certification; 
• Section 10 UAV System Maintenance; 
• Section 11 Training Requirements for Pilots and Controllers of UAVs; 
• Section 12 Getting Approval; 
• Section 13 Operator Certification; 
• Section 14 Insurance; and 
• Appendices 1, 2 and 3. 
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CHAPTER 11 APPENDIX 2: DATA DICTIONARY 
11.1 Physical Objects 
Table 2 contains the definitions of names of physical objects from the context 
diagram and the Product Breakdown Structure. 
Table 2  Dictionary of Physical Objects 
Object Description 
Air Data Terminal (ADT) The component of the DLS which is integrated into the AVS and 
communicates with the GDT. 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) The external system which coordinates and directs air traffic 
movement. 
Air Vehicle Subsystem 
(AVS) 
The Air Vehicle excluding the data link and payload. 
Airframe The structure of the AVS. 
ATC Radio The radio which provides the means of communication between 
the operator and ATC. 
Auxiliary Systems AVS subsystems such as electrical power generation and 
distribution, hydraulics and pneumatics but excluding avionics and 
propulsion. 
Avionics The electronics and computing components of the AVS which 
provide control and monitoring functionality. 
Command Console The component of the GCS which provides the interface to the 
operator. 
Data Link Subsystem 
(DLS) 
The subsystem which provides data communications between the 
GCS and AVS. 
Data Storage The component of the GCS which provides storage of data and 
voice communication recordings. 
Engine The propulsion system of the AVS. 
Environment Everything external to the UAS with the exception of ATC, other 
aircraft and the operator. 
Ground Control 
Subsystem (GCS) 
The ground based subsystems necessary for the launch, 
operation and recovery of an Uninhabited Air Vehicle. 
Ground Data Terminal 
(GDT) 
The component of the DLS which interfaces to the GCS and 
communicates with the ADT. 
Mission Planner The component of the GCS which provides the capability for teh 
operator to plan flights. 
Operator The human operator of the UAS. 
Other Aircraft Aircraft other than the Air Vehicle of the UAS. 
Power Subsystem  
Uninhabited Aircraft 
System (UAS) 
The subsystems, both airborne and ground based, necessary for 
the operation of an Uninhabited Air Vehicle. 
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11.2 Data flows 
Table 3 defines the data flows from the Context Diagram of Figure 5. 
Table 3  Dictionary of Data Flows 
Data Flow Name From To Description 
Input_From_Operator Operator UAS Consists of manual inputs 
and voice communications 
from the operator. 
Output_To_Operator UAS Operator Consists of output from the 
console display and voice 
communications to the 
operator. 
Signals_From_ATC ATC UAS Consists of voice 
communications from ATC 
and radar signals 
Signals_From_Environment Environment UAS Consists of the signals 
sensed from the environment, 
possibly including static and 
total pressures, angles of 
attack and sideslip, magnetic 
heading and satellite 
navigation signals. 
Signals_From_Other_Aircraft Other Aircraft UAS Consists of signals emitted or 
reflected by another aircraft. 
Signals_To_ATC UAS ATC Consists of voice 
communications from the 
operator and transponder 
squawks in response to ATC 
radar signals 
Signals_To_Other_Aircraft UAS Other Aircraft These signals may include 
emissions from an active 
collision avoidance system. 
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CHAPTER 12 APPENDIX 3: FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF 
AC101-1(0) 
Table 4 contains the results of functional analysis of the functional requirements from 
Table 1. 
Column (a) contains a unique identifier (pre-fixed with ‘F’ for function) for each 
function.  The identifier reflects the structure of the hierarchy of functions. 
Column (b) contains the functions at level one in the hierarchy. 
Column (c) contains the functions at level two in the hierarchy. 
Column (d) contains the functions at level three in the hierarchy. 
Column (e) contains the subsystem or subsystems which the function is allocated to.  
The subsystems are from the level 2 PBS in Figure 8 and are the Ground Control 
Subsystem (GCS), the Data Link Subsystem (DLS) and the Air Vehicle Subsystem 
(AVS).   
Column (f) contains the identifier(s) of the requirement(s) in Table 1 which specify the 
need for the function. 
Column (g) contains the number of the AC101-1(0) paragraph which contains the 
requirement. 
Where columns (f) and (g) are empty, this indicates that the function does not trace 
directly to a requirement, but was derived during either the requirements analysis or 
functional analysis process. 
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Table 4  Functionality from AC101-1(0) 
(a) 
ID 
(b) 
Functions - 
level 1 
(c) 
Functions - 
level 2 
(d) 
Functions - 
level 3 
(e) 
Allocated 
To 
(f) 
Reqt ID 
(g) 
Reqt 
Para 
F1 Command UAS      
F1.1  Plan flight     
F1.1.1   Plan engine 
failure 
procedure 
GCS C177 6.7.1a 
F1.1.2   Plan lost data 
link procedure 
GCS C60 
C178 
5.10.1 
6.7.1b 
F1.1.3   Plan loss of 
control 
procedure 
GCS C179 6.7.1c 
F1.1.4   Plan navigation 
failure 
procedure 
GCS C180 6.7.1d 
F1.1.5   Plan airframe 
damage 
procedure 
GCS C181 6.7.1e 
F1.1.6   Plan 
autonomous 
recovery 
procedure 
GCS   
F1.2  Command AV     
F1.2.1   Command orbit 
manueuvre 
GCS C72 5.10.4 
F1.2.2   Command 
autonomous 
recovery 
GCS C220 
C270 
8.2.2 
8.5.11 
F1.2.3   Command 
holding pattern 
GCS   
F1.2.4   Command AV 
attitude 
GCS   
F1.2.5   Command AV 
propulsion 
system 
GCS   
F1.2.6   Command AV 
navigation 
system 
GCS   
F1.2.7   Command AV 
systems 
GCS   
F1.2.8   Command AV 
position lights 
GCS   
F1.2.9   Command AV 
anti-collision 
lights 
GCS   
F1.2.10   Command 
transponder 
power 
GCS   
F1.2.11   Select SSR 
code 
GCS C68 
C71 
C91 
C137 
C283 
5.10.3 
5.10.4 
5.13.1 
5.16.1c 
8.6.1c 
F1.2.12   Command SSR 
identification 
squawk 
GCS   
F1.3  Display AV 
information 
  C140 
C213 
5.16.2 
8.2.1 
F1.3.1   Display flight GCS C95 5.13.4 
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(a) 
ID 
(b) 
Functions - 
level 1 
(c) 
Functions - 
level 2 
(d) 
Functions - 
level 3 
(e) 
Allocated 
To 
(f) 
Reqt ID 
(g) 
Reqt 
Para 
plan 
F1.3.2   Display AV 
attitude 
GCS C140 
C262 
5.16.2 
8.5.9 
F1.3.3   Display AV 
navigation 
GCS C262 8.5.9 
F1.3.4   Display AV 
propulsion 
GCS C262 8.5.9 
F1.3.5   Display AV 
systems 
GCS C262 8.5.9 
F1.3.6   Display AV 
sensors 
GCS C262 8.5.9 
F1.3.7   Display data 
link failure 
warning 
GCS C67 5.10.3 
F1.3.8   Display data 
link range cues 
GCS C252 8.5.6 
F1.3.9   Display 
degraded mode 
alerts 
GCS C216 8.2.1 
F1.3.10   Display AV 
health status 
GCS C217 
C296 
8.2.1 
8.6.1h 
F1.3.11   Display AV 
failure warnings 
GCS C233 8.5.2 
F1.3.12   Display AV 
power reserve 
GCS C299 8.6.1h 
F1.3.13   Display 
transponder 
power state 
GCS   
F1.3.14   Display SSR 
code 
GCS   
F1.4  Display ground system 
information 
   
F1.4.1   Display flight 
recorder status 
GCS C262 8.5.9 
F1.4.2   Display voice 
recorder 
GCS C262 8.5.9 
F1.5  Control ground 
system 
    
F1.5.1   Control flight 
system 
recorder 
GCS C262 8.5.9 
F1.5.2   Control voice 
recorder 
GCS C262 8.5.9 
F1.5.3   Manage 
electrical loads 
GCS C249 8.5.5 
F2 Provide data link communications   C218 8.2.1 
F2.1  Monitor data 
link signal 
strength 
 DLS C252 8.5.6 
F2.2  Transmit uplink  DLS   
F2.3  Receive uplink  DLS   
F2.4  Transmit 
downlink 
 DLS   
F2.5  Receive 
downlink 
 DLS   
F3 Operate AV      
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(a) 
ID 
(b) 
Functions - 
level 1 
(c) 
Functions - 
level 2 
(d) 
Functions - 
level 3 
(e) 
Allocated 
To 
(f) 
Reqt ID 
(g) 
Reqt 
Para 
F3.1  Provide high-
level control 
    
F3.1.1   Execute 
autonomous 
recovery 
AVS C62 
C68 
C183 
C220 
C270 
5.10.1a 
5.10.3 
6.7.2a 
8.2.2 
8.5.11 
F3.1.2   Execute engine 
failure 
procedure 
AVS C177 6.7.1a 
F3.1.3   Execute lost 
data link 
procedure 
AVS C60 
C178 
5.10.1 
6.7.1b 
F3.1.4   Execute lost 
control 
procedure 
AVS C179 6.7.1c 
F3.1.5   Execute 
navigation 
failure 
procedure 
AVS C180 6.7.1d 
F3.1.6   Execute 
airframe 
damage 
procedure 
AVS C181 6.7.1e 
F3.1.7   Fly holding 
pattern 
AVS C55 5.9.3 
F3.1.8   Fly to recovery 
point 
AVS C62 
C183 
5.10.1a 
6.7.2a 
F3.1.9   Fly orbit 
manoeuvre 
AVS   
F3.2  Control AV   C213 8.2.1 
F3.2.1   Control AV 
attitude 
AVS C262 8.5.9 
F3.2.2   Control AV 
propulsion 
system 
AVS C262 8.5.9 
F3.2.3   Control AV 
navigation 
system 
AVS C262 8.5.9 
F3.2.4   Control AV 
systems 
AVS C262 8.5.9 
F3.2.5   Control AV 
sensors 
AVS C262 8.5.9 
F3.2.6   Control AV 
position lights 
AVS C277 8.6.1a 
F3.2.7   Control AV 
anti-collision 
lights 
AVS C280 8.6.1b 
F3.2.8   Control 
transponder 
power 
AVS C137 
C283 
5.16.1c 
8.6.1c 
F3.2.9   Squawk SSR 
identification 
AVS C91 
C137 
C283 
5.13.1 
5.16.1c 
8.6.1c 
F3.2.10   Squawk lost 
link code 
AVS C68 5.10.3 
F3.2.11   Set SSR code AVS   
F3.3  Monitor AV     
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(a) 
ID 
(b) 
Functions - 
level 1 
(c) 
Functions - 
level 2 
(d) 
Functions - 
level 3 
(e) 
Allocated 
To 
(f) 
Reqt ID 
(g) 
Reqt 
Para 
systems 
F3.3.1   Detect engine 
failure 
AVS C177 6.7.1a 
F3.3.2   Detect loss of 
data link 
AVS C67 
C68 
C178 
5.10.3 
5.10.3 
6.7.1b 
F3.3.3   Detect loss of 
control 
AVS C179 6.7.1c 
F3.3.4   Detect 
navigation 
failure 
AVS C180 6.7.1d 
F3.3.5   Detect airframe 
damage 
AVS C181 6.7.1e 
F3.3.6   Detect system 
failures 
AVS C233 8.5.2 
F3.4  Manage 
electrical loads 
 AVS C248 8.5.5 
F4 Provide ATC 
communication
s 
  GCS C114 5.14.1b 
F5 Test system 
functions 
     
F5.1  Provide 
diagnostic 
capability 
 AVS 
GCS 
DLS 
C217 8.2.1 
F5.2  Provide BIT  AVS 
GCS 
DLS 
C296 8.6.1h 
F6 Store data      
F6.1  Store AV status     
F6.1.1   Record AV 
status 
GCS C293 8.6.1g 
F6.1.2   Erase AV 
status records 
GCS   
F6.1.3   Replay AV 
status records 
GCS   
F6.2  Store voice 
communication
s 
    
F6.2.1   Record voice 
communication
s 
GCS C293 8.6.1g 
F6.2.2   Erase voice 
communication
s records 
GCS   
F6.2.3   Replay voice 
communication
s records 
GCS   
F6.3  Store flight plan     
F6.3.1   Save flight plan AVS 
GCS 
  
F6.3.2   Delete flight 
plan 
AVS 
GCS 
  
F6.3.3   Access flight 
plan 
AVS 
GCS 
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CHAPTER 13 APPENDIX 4: FUNCTION HIERARCHY 
DIAGRAMS 
 
 
Figure 10  Function Hierarchy Down to Level 1 
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Figure 11  Function Hierarchy Below Function F1.0 “Command UAS” 
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Figure 12  Function Hierarchy Below Function F2.0 “Provide Data Link Communications” 
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position lights
3.2.7 Control AV 
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3.2.3 Control AV 
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lost link code
3.2.2 Control AV 
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3.2.1 Control AV 
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of control
3.3.4 Detect 
navigation failure
3.3.2 Detect loss 
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3.3.1 Detect 
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3.3.6 Detect 
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Figure 13  Function Hierarchy Below Function F3.0 “Operate AV” 
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Figure 14  Function Hierarchy Below Function F5.0 “Test System Functions” 
 
 
Figure 15  Function Hierarchy Below Function F6.0 “Store Data” 
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CHAPTER 14 APPENDIX 5: FUNCTIONAL FLOW 
DIAGRAMS 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Top Level Functional Flow 
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Figure 17.  Functional Flow for Function 0 “Operate UAS” 
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Figure 18.  Functional Flow for Function 1.0 “Command UAS” 
 
 
 
 2.2
 Transmit 
 Uplink 
AND
2.3
 Receive 
 Uplink 
 2.4
 Transmit 
 Downlink 
 2.5
 Receive 
 Downlink 
REF
2.0
Provide Data 
link 
Communications
REF
0
Operate
UAS
2.1
Monitor Data 
Link Signal 
Strength
 
 
Figure 19.  Functional Flow for Function 2.0 “Provide Data Link Communications” 
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Figure 20.  Functional Flow for Function 3.0 “Operate AV” 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21.  Functional Flow for Function 5.0 “Test System Functions” 
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Figure 22.  Functional Flow for Function 6.0 “Store Data” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 1.1 “Plan Flight” 
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Figure 24  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 1.2 “Operate AV” 
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Figure 25  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 1.3 “Display AV Information” 
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Figure 26  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 1.4 “Display Ground System Information” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 1.5 “Control Ground System” 
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Figure 28  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 3.1 “Provide High Level Control” 
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Figure 29  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 3.2 “Control AV” 
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Figure 30  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 3.3 “Monitor AV Systems” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 6.1 “Store AV Status” 
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Figure 32  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 6.2 “Store Voice Communication” 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33  Functional Flow Diagram for Function 6.3 “Store Flight Plan” 
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CHAPTER 15 APPENDIX 6: SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL 
REQUIREMENTS AND ALLOCATION 
 
Table 5  Subsystem Functional Requirements and Allocation 
(a) 
ID 
(b) 
Functions 
(c) 
System 
Allocation 
(d) 
Subsystem Reqts 
(e) 
Allocated To 
F1 Command UAS    
F1.1 Plan flight  The GCS shall provide the 
capability to plan flights. 
Mission Planner 
F1.1.1 Plan engine 
failure procedure 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability to specify a 
flight plan procedure to be 
executed in the event of 
engine failure. 
Mission Planner 
F1.1.2 Plan lost data 
link procedure 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability to specify a 
flight plan procedure to be 
executed in the event of 
loss of data link 
communications. 
Mission Planner 
F1.1.3 Plan loss of 
control procedure 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability to specify a 
flight plan procedure to be 
executed in the event of 
loss of control. 
Mission Planner 
F1.1.4 Plan 
navigation failure 
procedure 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability to specify a 
flight plan procedure to be 
executed in the event of a 
navigation failure. 
Mission Planner 
F1.1.5 Plan airframe 
damage procedure 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability to specify a 
flight plan procedure to be 
executed in the event of 
damage to the airframe. 
Mission Planner 
F1.1.6 Plan 
autonomous recovery 
procedure 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability to specify a 
flight plan procedure to be 
executed to autonomously 
recover the AV. 
Mission Planner 
F1.2 Command AV    
F1.2.1 Command 
orbit manueuvre 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to command the AV to 
orbit a designated 
position. 
Command Console 
F1.2.2 Command 
autonomous recovery 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to command autonomous 
recovery of the AV. 
Command Console 
F1.2.3 Command 
holding pattern 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to command the AV to 
enter a holding pattern. 
Command Console 
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F1.2.4 Command AV 
attitude 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to input AV attitude 
demands. 
Command Console 
F1.2.5 Command AV 
propulsion system 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to input AV propulsion 
system demands. 
Command Console 
F1.2.6 Command AV 
navigation system 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to input AV navigation 
system demands. 
Command Console 
F1.2.7 Command AV 
systems 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to input AV systems 
demands. 
Command Console 
F1.2.8 Command AV 
position lights 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to demand the AV position 
lights be on or off. 
Command Console 
F1.2.9 Command AV 
anti-collision lights 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to demand the AV anti-
coliision lights be on or off. 
Command Console 
F1.2.10 Command 
transponder power 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to demand the AV 
transponder power be on 
or off. 
Command Console 
F1.2.11 Select SSR 
code 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to demand a selected 
SSR code. 
Command Console 
F1.2.12 Command 
SSR identification 
squawk 
GCS The GCS shall provide the 
capability for the operator 
to demand the SSR 
transponder squawk an 
identification. 
Command Console 
F1.3 Display AV 
information 
   
F1.3.1 Display flight 
plan 
GCS The GCS shall display the 
AV flight plan. 
Command Console 
F1.3.2 Display AV 
attitude 
GCS The GCS shall display the 
AV attitude. 
Command Console 
F1.3.3 Display AV 
navigation 
GCS The GCS shall display AV 
navigation information. 
Command Console 
F1.3.4 Display AV 
propulsion 
GCS The GCS shall display AV 
propulsion information. 
Command Console 
F1.3.5 Display AV 
systems 
GCS The GCS shall display AV 
systems information. 
Command Console 
F1.3.6 Display AV 
sensors 
GCS The GCS shall display AV 
sensor information. 
Command Console 
F1.3.7 Display data 
link failure warning 
GCS The GCS shall display a 
warning in the event of 
failure of the data link. 
Command Console 
F1.3.8 Display data 
link range cues 
GCS The GCS shall display 
range cues for the data 
link. 
Command Console 
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F1.3.9 Display 
degraded mode alerts 
GCS The GCS shall display 
alerts when the system 
operates in a degraded 
mode. 
Command Console 
F1.3.10 Display AV 
health status 
GCS The GCS shall display the 
health status of the AV. 
Command Console 
F1.3.11 Display AV 
failure warnings 
GCS The GCS shall display 
warnings of AV failures. 
Command Console 
F1.3.12 Display AV 
power reserve 
GCS The GCS shall display the 
level of the AV power 
reserve. 
Command Console 
F1.3.13 Display 
transponder power 
state 
GCS The GCS shall display the 
power state of the AV 
transponder. 
Command Console 
F1.3.14 Display SSR 
code 
GCS The GCS shall display the 
Av transponder SSR code. 
Command Console 
F1.4 Display ground system 
information 
  
F1.4.1 Display flight 
recorder status 
GCS The GCS shall display the 
status of the flight data 
recorder. 
Command Console 
F1.4.2 Display voice 
recorder 
GCS The GCS shall display the 
status of the voice 
recorder. 
Command Console 
F1.5 Control ground 
system 
   
F1.5.1 Control flight 
system recorder 
GCS The GCS shall provide 
controls for the flight data 
recorder. 
Command Console 
F1.5.2 Control voice 
recorder 
GCS The GCS shall provide 
controls for the voice 
recorder. 
Command Console 
F1.5.3 Manage 
electrical loads 
GCS The GCS shall provide 
controls to manage 
electrical loads. 
Power subsystem 
F2 Provide data link 
communications 
   
F2.1 Monitor data link 
signal strength 
DLS The data link system shall 
monitor the signal strength 
of the data link. 
GDT 
ADT 
F2.2 Transmit uplink DLS The data link system shall 
transmit data from the 
GCS to the AV. 
GDT 
F2.3 Receive uplink DLS The data link system shall 
receive data transmitted to 
the AV from the GCS. 
ADT 
F2.4 Transmit downlink DLS The data link system shall 
transmit data from the AV 
to the GCS. 
ADT 
F2.5 Receive downlink DLS The data link system shall 
receive data transmitted to 
the GCS from the AV. 
GDT 
F3 Operate AV    
F3.1 Provide high-level 
control 
   
F3.1.1 Execute 
autonomous recovery 
AVS The AV shall be capable 
of autonomous recovery. 
Avionics 
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F3.1.2 Execute 
engine failure 
procedure 
AVS The AV shall execute an 
engine failure procedure in 
the event of an engine 
failure. 
Avionics 
F3.1.3 Execute lost 
data link procedure 
AVS The AV shall execute a 
lost data link procedure in 
the event of loss of data 
link communications. 
Avionics 
F3.1.4 Execute lost 
control procedure 
AVS The AV shall execute a 
lost control procedure in 
the event of loss of 
control. 
Avionics 
F3.1.5 Execute 
navigation failure 
procedure 
AVS The Av shall execute a 
navigation failure 
procedure in the event of 
failure of the navigation 
system. 
Avionics 
F3.1.6 Execute 
airframe damage 
procedure 
AVS The Av shall execute an 
airframe damage 
procedure in the event of 
damage to the airframe. 
Avionics 
F3.1.7 Fly holding 
pattern 
AVS The AV shall fly a holding 
pattern on command. 
Avionics 
F3.1.8 Fly to recovery 
point 
AVS The AV shall fly to the 
specified recovery point 
on command. 
Avionics 
F3.1.9 Fly orbit 
manoeuvre 
AVS The AV shall fly an orbit 
manoeuvre on command. 
Avionics 
F3.2 Control AV    
F3.2.1 Control AV 
attitude 
AVS The AV shall control 
attitude in response to 
demands. 
Avionics 
Airframe 
F3.2.2 Control AV 
propulsion system 
AVS The AV shall control the 
propulsion system in 
response to demands. 
Avionics 
Engine 
F3.2.3 Control AV 
navigation system 
AVS The AV shall control the 
navigation system in 
response to demands. 
Avionics 
F3.2.4 Control AV 
systems 
AVS The AV shall control 
aircraft systems in 
response to demands. 
Avionics 
Auxiliary systems 
F3.2.5 Control AV 
sensors 
AVS The AV shall control 
aircraft sensors in 
response to demands. 
Avionics 
F3.2.6 Control AV 
position lights 
AVS The AV shall control 
position lights in response 
to demands. 
Avionics 
Airframe 
F3.2.7 Control AV 
anti-collision lights 
AVS The AV shall control anti-
collision lights in response 
to demands. 
Avionics 
Airframe 
F3.2.8 Control 
transponder power 
AVS The AV shall control 
power to the transponder 
in response to demands. 
Avionics 
F3.2.9 Squawk SSR 
identification 
AVS The AV shall squawk SSR 
identification on 
command. 
Avionics 
F3.2.10 Squawk lost 
link code 
AVS The AV shall squawk the 
SSR lost communications 
code in the event of loss 
of data link 
communications. 
Avionics 
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F3.2.11 Set SSR code AVS The AV shall set the SSR 
code as commanded. 
Avionics 
F3.3 Monitor AV 
systems 
   
F3.3.1 Detect engine 
failure 
AVS The AV shall detect 
engine failures. 
Avionics 
Engine 
F3.3.2 Detect loss of 
data link 
AVS The AV shall detect loss of 
data link communcations. 
Avionics 
F3.3.3 Detect loss of 
control 
AVS The AV shall detect loss of 
control. 
Avionics 
Airframe 
F3.3.4 Detect 
navigation failure 
AVS The AV shall detect failure 
of the navigation system. 
Avionics 
F3.3.5 Detect 
airframe damage 
AVS The AV shall detect 
damage to the airframe. 
Avionics 
Airframe 
F3.3.6 Detect system 
failures 
AVS The AV shall detect 
systems failures. 
Avionics 
Auxiliary systems 
F3.4 Manage electrical 
loads 
AVS The AV shall manage 
electrical loads. 
Avionics 
Auxiliary systems 
F4 Provide ATC 
communications 
GCS The GCS shall provide 
communications between 
the operator and ATC. 
ATC Radio 
F5 Test system functions    
F5.1 Provide diagnostic 
capability 
AVS The AV shall enable fault 
diagnosis. 
all 
F5.2 Provide BIT AVS The AV shall provide BIT. all 
F5.1 Provide diagnostic 
capability 
GCS The GCS shall enable 
fault diagnosis. 
all 
F5.2 Provide BIT GCS The GCS shall provide 
BIT. 
all 
F5.1 Provide diagnostic 
capability 
DLS The data link system shall 
enable fault diagnosis. 
all 
F5.2 Provide BIT DLS The data link system shall 
provide BIT. 
all 
F6 Store data    
F6.1 Store AV status    
F6.1.1 Record AV 
status 
GCS The GCS shall record AV 
status data. 
Data Storage 
F6.1.2 Erase AV 
status records 
GCS The GCS shall erase AV 
status data recrods on 
command. 
Data Storage 
F6.1.3 Replay AV 
status records 
GCS The GCS shall replay AV 
status data records on 
command. 
Data Storage 
F6.2 Store voice 
communications 
   
F6.2.1 Record voice 
communications 
GCS The GCS shall record 
voice communications. 
Data Storage 
F6.2.2 Erase voice 
communications 
records 
GCS The GCS shall erase 
voice communications 
records on command. 
Data Storage 
F6.2.3 Replay voice 
communications 
records 
GCS The GCS shall replay 
voice communicatiosn 
records on command. 
Data Storage 
F6.3 Store flight plan    
F6.3.1 Save flight 
plan 
GCS The GCS shall save the 
flight plan. 
Data Storage 
 97 
F6.3.2 Delete flight 
plan 
GCS The GCS shall delete a 
specified flight plan on 
command. 
Data Storage 
F6.3.3 Access flight 
plan 
GCS The GCS shall retrieve a 
specified flight plan on 
command. 
Data Storage 
F6.3.1 Save flight 
plan 
AVS The AV shall save the 
flight plan. 
Avionics 
F6.3.2 Delete flight 
plan 
AVS The AV shall delete a 
specified flight plan on 
command. 
Avionics 
F6.3.3 Access flight 
plan 
AVS The AV shall retrieve a 
specified flight plan on 
command. 
Avionics 
 
 
 
